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INTRODUCTION 
 
Human beings are bombarded with information from the sensory world. As an 
information processor with limited capacity, the human perceptual system must selectively 
allocate resources to relevant stimuli while ignoring the trivial. The spectacular functionality of 
the perceptual system leaves us with the impression of a vast and complete sensory experience, 
where our knowledge of the objects and actions about us is only limited by the physical 
constraints of our eyes and ears. However, experiments reveal the depth of our subjective 
experience is an illusion. We readily fail to detect enormous changes in our environment (Levin 
& Simons, 1997; Simons & Levin, 1998; Rensink, 2010), neglect objects at or near the center of 
fixation (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999; Smith, Lamont & Henderson, 2012), and forget 
items in our own hands (Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe and Sullivan, 2003). Although many cognitive 
scientists have studied the failures of attention and memory, relatively few have investigated the 
environmental and task factors that facilitate cognition in everyday situations: why we pay 
attention to select items in the real world and ignore others. Here I present three studies that 
investigate how the perception of actions and agents guides attention and memory. Chapter 1 
investigates the limits of attention and memory when tracking multiple events, Chapter 2 
explores constraints to the rapid perception of another agent’s visual access, and Chapter 3 tests 
how social agents guide visual search.  
The relatively young field of event perception offers insight into the cognitive processes 
governing the moment-to-moment representations that give rise to conscious awareness. 
Research in event perception demonstrates that individuals parse continuous activity into discrete 
units determined by relatively few but informative dynamic properties in an event, such as global 
shifts in spatial relationships or more local changes in goals and intentions. This contrasts with 
inattention research suggesting that people represent relatively few details in a scene (Rensink, 
O’Regan & Clark, 1997; Simons & Rensink, 2005) and do not readily recall those details that are 
encoded (Simons, Chabris, Schnur & Levin, 2002; Mitroff, Simons & Levin, 2004; Varakin, 
Levin & Collins, 2007). The perception of new events at specific points of transition suggests 
that certain properties receive preferential encoding even as inattention research demonstrates 
that the majority of stimulation may fall beneath awareness. The prevailing theory of event 
perception, Event Segmentation Theory (EST; Zacks et al, 2007), proposes that individuals 
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cyclically perceive, encode and anticipate events through an ongoing representation of the 
immediate context in working memory. These event models are selective representations of 
specific features relevant for comprehending ongoing behavior. Research indicates that viewers 
encode properties into event models at the boundaries between discrete events (Baker & Levin, 
2015), and rapidly forget information from completed events (Morrow, Bower & Greenspan, 
1989; Radvansky, Tamplin & Kraweitz, 2010; Swallow et al, 2011). Researchers have proposed 
that an event model is a representation of “what is going on now” in working memory (Zacks et 
al, 2007) that is abstracted at event boundaries to form the units of long-term episodic memory 
(Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011). Event perception as described by EST involves a system that 
selectively attends to statistically relevant properties, ignores irrelevant information, facilitates 
awareness to immediate contextual information and determines the formation of long-term 
memory, all while operating efficiently enough to permit planning and coordination during 
everyday activity. However, no experiment has empirically has demonstrated how individuals 
monitor multiple events or the effect of task load on awareness of ongoing events. Chapter 2 
measures the effect of viewing multiple events on event perception using a novel measure 
adapted from Hymel, Baker & Levin (2015), indicating that event perception requires attentional 
focus and working memory. 
Recent evidence suggests that social stimuli may guide early visual processing. 
Developmental psychologists have long considered theory of mind (the ability to think about the 
thoughts, feelings, beliefs and desires of someone else; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) as a 
relatively late developing (Flavell et al, 1981) and cognitively taxing process (Lin, Keysar & 
Epley, 2004). However, emerging research suggests that adults (Samson et al, 2011) and infants 
as young as 5 months (Kovacs, Teglas & Endress, 2010) can rapidly judge whether an agent has 
limited visual access to a scene. In a recent study, we confirmed that this “early system of 
perspective taking” is not due to low-level attentional cues, and likely stems from a rapid 
computation of an agent’s line-of-sight access to a target of attention (Baker, Levin & Saylor, 
2016). However, the exact circumstances that give rise to this default perspective taking are still 
largely unknown. I expand upon these findings in Chapter 2 to investigate whether the default 
calculation of another’s perspective extends to complex situations featuring multiple agents or 
targets of attention. Results suggest a much more limited system than previously hypothesized 
that signals when the observer has privileged access to an attended set of objects. 
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The final chapter of this dissertation extends the study of actions and agents to investigate 
how social stimuli shape the deployment of visual attention. The results of Chapter 2 suggest 
some form of rapid but limited computation of another’s visual perspective. Several researchers 
have proposed that this system operates by selectively guiding attention to social stimuli (Leslie, 
Freidman & German, 2005; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), but there has been no empirical 
demonstration that social agents alter the deployment of visual attention. Chapter 3 tests how the 
presence of another agent alters visual search, leading to the somewhat surprising discovery that 
social agents bias visual search to regions an agent cannot access. 
The three studies in this dissertation explore the cognitive processes that facilitate for the 
perception of actions, agents and the targets of joint visual access. Together, these studies 
explore the control processes involved in awareness of scenes, events and social interaction, and 
further our understanding of one of the most basic questions in the history of psychology: Why 
do we attend to some things and ignore others? 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
DECREASED AWARENESS FOR PARALLEL EVENTS REVEALS LIMITED CAPACITY 
OF EVENT PERCEPTION 
 
Abstract 
 Event segmentation theory (EST) proposes that individuals comprehend ongoing activity 
by selectively attending to relevant features and holding those features in working memory for 
the duration of the event. However, no research has explored how individuals monitor multiple 
events, or comprehend activity while under cognitive load. This study tests whether tracking 
multiple events taxes impairs the depth of event perception. Participants detected fewer causally 
impossible actions when viewing two events in parallel, suggesting a limited ability to encode 
and compare properties during event perception. Participants detected fewer target actions in 
parallel events when cued to attend to the target-containing sequence and ignore the distractor, 
although cuing partially mediated failures to detect target actions. Finally, working memory load 
from a secondary task also decreased target detection when viewing a single sequence of events. 
These results confirm that event perception relies on a limited working memory capacity that is 
further constrained by the focus of attention. 
 
Introduction 
 Even a relatively demure event, like drinking your morning coffee, contains an 
overwhelming amount of sensory information. It is an astounding feat of the perceptual system 
that we not only make sense of dynamic activity, but that our comprehension of events generally 
agrees with other observers. Studies indicate that individuals generate models of a situation as it 
unfolds, preferentially attending to and encoding the spatio-temporal relationships, agents, goals, 
intentions and causes that best inform event comprehension (Zacks, Speer & Reynolds, 2009; 
Kives, Ware & Baker, 2015). Researchers have suggested that these event models (sometimes 
referred to as situation models; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998) are maintained in working memory 
and refreshed at the start of each new event (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver & Reynolds, 2007; 
Swallow, Zacks & Abrams, 2009; Swallow et al, 2011). However, theories of event perception 
have yet to demonstrate how a single event model could possibly process the spontaneity of 
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everyday life, which often requires attention to two or more disparate events. This study 
therefore begins with a simple question: What happens when viewers must monitor two events in 
parallel?  Here, I demonstrate that tracking two events greatly reduces the encoding of details 
within each event. In five studies, I demonstrate that failures of event perception arise through a 
combination of divided attention and working memory capacity. Although many researchers 
have suggested that event perception requires attention and working memory, this is the first 
study to reveal failures of event perception when these domain-general resources are taxed. 
 
The Limited Capacity of Event Perception 
Everyday events contain vast amounts of information. Researchers throughout the history 
of psychology have theorized how the mind selects relevant information from the stream of 
consciousness and ignores that which is irrelevant (James; 1904; Koffka, 1922; Wertheimer, 
1922; Gibson, 1966; Johannsson, von Hofsten & Jansson, 1980). However, it was only relatively 
recently that Newtson (1973) proposed studying dynamic events as discrete units in time. When 
Newtson simply asked participants to press a key when they believed a new event occurred in a 
film, he found that participants not only segmented temporal information into discrete units, but 
that they did so reliably and in good agreement across raters (Newtson & Enquist, 1976; 
Newtson, Rindner, Miller & LaCross, 1978; Newtson, Hairfield, Bloomingdale & Cutino, 1987). 
The ability to reliably parse continuous information into coherent units suggests a system that 
periodically and selectively encodes only features necessary for comprehension. Research has 
demonstrated the segmentation of events hinges on attention to several specific changing 
properties, such as spatial relationships, agents and goals (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Schwann 
& Garsoffsky, 2004; Swallow, Zacks & Abrams, 2009; Swallow et al, 2011; Huff, Papenmeier & 
Zacks, 2013). These specific transitions not only signal the onset of a new event, but also trigger 
increased comparison of features in working memory (Baker & Levin, 2015), determine the 
features encoded in long-term memory (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011) and signal the rapid forgetting 
of irrelevant information from previous events (Radvansky, Tamplin & Kraweitz, 2010). Such 
results suggest that event perception requires selective attention to relevant properties and an 
ability to hold and compare properties in recent memory to perceive a complete unit of time. 
The prevailing theory of event perception, Event Segmentation Theory (EST), has 
attempted to model the factors that influence event perception. In general, the theory states that 
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visual events are perceived in a hierarchical fashion, nesting primitive actions (e.g. motion or 
spatial displacement) within overarching conceptual events (defined by goals, schemas, patterns 
or previous experience). The central component of EST is the event model, a working memory 
representation built from multimodal input, including visual, textual and auditory information 
(Baggett, 1979; Magliano, Miller & Zwaan, 2001; Zacks, Speer & Reynolds, 2009). Event 
models contain perceptual information of objects and spatial relationships, as well as goal state 
information of where an object has been and where it is most likely to be next (Spapé & 
Hommel, 2010). This latter information is used to form perceptual predictions that frame sensory 
input and assist in comprehension (Reynolds, Zacks & Braver 2007). EST states that perceptual 
predictions are generated in part through bottom-up inference of causality and trajectory 
(Reynolds, Zacks & Braver, 2007; Zacks, 2004; Zacks, Swallow, Speer, Vettel & McAvoy, 
2006; Hard, Tversky & Lang, 2006; Zacks, Kurby, Eisenberg & Haroutunian, 2011). Meanwhile, 
observers also track information pertaining to agent goals, including their immediate physical 
course (Baird & Baldwin, 2001; Baldwin, Baird, Saylor & Clark, 2001; Baldwin, Andersson, 
Saffran & Meyer, 2008), but also relatively long term intentions (Robertson & Suci, 1980; 
Wegner & Guiliano, 1983; Morrow, Bower & Greenspan, 1989; Wilson, Rinck, McNamara, 
Bower & Morrow, 1993; Magliano, Taylor & Kim, 2005). Future events are further extrapolated 
using prior experience and deductive inference (Cohen & Ebbeson, 1978; Ebbeson, 1980; Zacks 
et al, 2007; Magliano & Zacks, 2011; Radvansky, Tamplin, Armendarez & Thompson, 2014). 
Thus, event models contain a select but still quite substantial subset of the total information 
available for the comprehension of ongoing activity. 
Event models have three related functions. First, event models are representations in 
working memory containing information relevant to the immediate context. Event models thus 
facilitate increased awareness of relevant objects and actions for the duration of the event 
(Hanson & Hirst, 1989; Lassiter & Slaw, 1991; Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Schwan & Garsoffsky, 
2004; Speer & Zacks, 2005; Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Radvansky, Tamplin & Krawietz, 2010; 
Zacks et al, 2011; Swallow et al, 2011; Kurby & Zacks, 2012; Sargent et al, 2013). Second, 
event models guide perception to predict future behavior (Reynolds, Zacks & Braver, 2007; 
Zacks, Kurby, Eisenberg & Haroutunian, 2011). Models act as the priors of each event, guiding 
perception to subsequent activity through low-level causal perception (Cutting, 1981; Strickland 
& Keil, 2011) or through experience-driven prediction (Cohn & Paczynski, 2013; Swallow, 
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Zacks & Braver, 2009). Lastly, event models are basic units of long-term memory (Ezzyat & 
Davachi, 2010; Staresina & Davachi, 2009). Information present at the event boundary is the 
most likely to be stored in long-term memory (Newtson et al, 1987; Boltz, 1992; Davachi, 2006), 
indicating that episodic memory is less like continuous video playback, and more like discrete 
panels in a comic strip (illustrated – literally – in Cohn, 2013).  
Event perception as explained by EST is an expansive control network that not only 
facilitates attention to changing properties, but generates near-future predictions based on 
calculations from immediate perception and previous experience, all while updating information 
in working memory. Event perception theoretically occurs automatically, or at least must operate 
efficiently enough that perceivers can comprehend ongoing events while engaging in any number 
of cognitively demanding tasks, such as planning actions or engaging in conversation. This is 
additionally impressive given the known limits of attention and working memory. Furthermore, 
EST assumes viewers are tracking, updating and forming predictions for one event at a time, 
using a single expansive event model. The complexity of EST makes the capacity limits of event 
perception unclear, and it is uncertain what the consequences of monitoring multiple events may 
be. The current study investigated the cognitive costs of event perception by testing participant 
awareness of two events viewed in parallel. Using a variety of experimental designs, I show that 
failures of event perception arise through the limits of attention and working memory.  
 
Potential Constraints on Event Perception 
This study tested whether tracking multiple events impairs event perception. This 
relatively simple question informs our understanding of the cognitive components necessary to 
comprehend ongoing behavior. Participants either viewed a sequence of actions (e.g., a man 
replacing flashlight batters) in isolation or in parallel with another sequence in an ABAB fashion 
(e.g., switching between the flashlight event and an entirely separate event with a different man 
using a screwdriver). They then responded whether a shot from either sequence appeared out of 
sequential order (e.g., using the screwdriver before picking it up).  
Several hypotheses can be generated as to how the perceptual system responds to 
multiple ongoing streams of activity. First, it is not a foregone conclusion that viewing two 
events would hinder event perception at all. Evidence suggests that event perception relies on the 
detection of critical transitions that denote the initiation of new events. Crucially, event 
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perception remains more or less unperturbed so long as these event boundary properties exist 
(Cohn, 2013). Filmmakers have long observed that shortening an event through editing does not 
alter viewer understanding of that event (Cutting, Delong & Nothelfer, 2010), and that editing an 
event from multiple viewpoints does not alter event perception (Schwan, Garsoffky & Hesse, 
2000). In fact, displaying multiple events in parallel is common practice in most conventional 
films, and individuals with no prior experiment with film comprehend events presented in 
parallel (Schwan & Ilidrar, 2010). Perhaps most strikingly, the temporal order of events does not 
appear to alter event perception: participants viewing an unfamiliar event (e.g., constructing a 
saxophone) normally or in reverse segmented an event at the exact same locations, regardless of 
their prior knowledge (Hard, Tversky & Lang, 2006). Such findings reinforce that event 
perception is grounded in the perception of specific objects and actions. It is possible that the 
perceptual system detects the specific properties indicative of new events and uses top-down 
inference to fill in the gaps, and that the same properties will be encoded regardless of the 
number of events viewed. Experiment 1 addresses this possibility by comparing event perception 
when viewing a single ever versus two events in parallel.  
However, events are not viewed as a series of static images, and likely rely on the 
dynamic temporal relationships linking objects and actions. Nonetheless, event perception might 
operate by detecting the relatively specific transitions indicative of new events, such as low-level 
motion (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Scholl & Nakayama, 2001; Smith & Santacreu, 2016) or 
spatial cues (Meyerhoff et al, 2011; Huff & Schwann, 2012; Baker & Levin, 2015). This 
perceptual continuity hypothesis would predict that viewing events in parallel would disrupt 
event perception by severing the continuity from one moment to the next. Experiment 2 
specifically addresses this low-level explanation for event perception by testing event perception 
for pairs of actions in parallel and single events. If event perception relies on perceptual 
continuity from one moment to the next, then event perception should be unimpeded so long as 
the perceptual flow is not interrupted between views of an event. 
An alternative to the perceptual continuity hypothesis is that event perception requires 
unbroken attention to a stream of activity, and that dividing attention between two events would 
reduce the amount of detail encoded during event perception. Phenomena such as inattentional 
blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998), conceptual masking (Potter, 1976) and the attentional blink 
(Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992) suggest that splitting attention between items reduces 
		 9	
perceptual awareness. Given that the perception of new events captures attention (Raisig, Wilke, 
Hagendorf & van der Meer, 2010; Mital, Smith, Hill & Henderson, 2011; Huff, Papenmeier & 
Zacks, 2012), an attentional shift hypothesis would predict that rapidly shifting attention between 
events would reduce the quality of information encoded. Experiments 3 and 4 test the perception 
of parallel events when participants are instructed to attend to a target sequence and ignore an 
irrelevant sequence. The attentional shift hypothesis would predict improved quality of event 
perception when attention is directed to the target sequence. 
On final alternative would posit that event perception requires an active maintenance of 
recent information in working memory. Event perception is more than just the attention to 
features and transients, as comprehension often requires knowledge of long-term goals, mental 
states and spatial relationships (e.g., Magliano, Taylor & Kim, 2005). Researchers have 
consistently found relationships between the perception of new events and the contents of 
working memory (Speer & Zacks, 2005; Swallow, Zacks & Abrams, 2009; Radvansky, Tamplin 
& Krawietz, 2010; Swallow et al, 2011), and the reliability with which individuals segment and 
remember events is significantly correlated with their performance on working memory tasks 
(Sargent et al, 2013). Therefore, a working model hypothesis would posit that event perception 
requires the encoding and comparison properties in working memory. Individuals compensate 
for the limited capacity of working memory by only encoding a select subset of the information 
available during event perception. Individuals monitoring two events would therefore encode 
fewer features for each individual event as working memory reaches capacity. Experiment 5 
directly tests the effect of working memory load on event perception. 
 
Measuring Event Perception 
Most tests of event perception have focused on the segmentation of continuous activity 
into discrete events (e.g., Newtson & Enquist, 1976; Zacks, Tversky & Iyer, 2001) or have 
measured memory of properties from recent events (e.g., Swallow, Zacks & Abrams, 2009; 
Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011; Swallow et al., 2011). However, these designs are insufficient to 
measure the quality of encoding during online event perception. For instance, segmentation 
behavior does not reveal the level of detail encoded when a new event begins, or participant’s 
confidence in their judgments. Likewise, memory paradigms measure recall of properties within 
an event but do not measure participant’s on-line perception of the entire sequence of actions 
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surrounding those properties. For example, a participant could remember that an event contained 
a red car even though they failed to perceive that the red car ran a stop sign. Furthermore, 
differences in memory paradigms may be attributable to errors in recall rather than encoding. 
The current study therefore adapted a task from Hymel, Levin & Baker (2015) that measured on-
line perception of the causal sequence of events.  
Hymel, Levin & Baker asked participants to watch a rapid sequence of actions 
demonstrating a single common event, where each step in the event was shown in a new shot. 
Critical trials reversed the order of two actions, effectively showing an impossible event. For 
example, a misordered coffee event showed a woman picking up a coffee pot, pouring coffee, 
reaching for a sugar packet, pouring sugar, stirring the coffee and then reaching for a coffee 
stirrer. The ability to detect this causal misordering required participants to perceive each action 
as well as that action’s temporal relationship with previous actions. Participants found the task 
challenging: participants rarely detected misordered actions in an incidental task, and performed 
worse during an explicit task when under cognitive load from a secondary verbal overshadowing 
task. The misordering-detection task reveals that event perception is capacity-limited. 
Consequently, testing the factors that strain this capacity can inform the cognitive components 
necessary for event perception. 
 
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 measured event perception while monitoring two events in parallel. If event 
perception is capacity-limited then monitoring two events in parallel should lead to reduced 
encoding as capacity is filled. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Two hundred participants (106 male, median age of 31) were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website for a $.35 compensation. Researchers have validated Mechanical Turk 
for use in cognition research (e.g., Paolacci, Chanlder & Ipeirotis, 2010; Germine et al, 2012). 
Participants were randomly assigned to the parallel-event or single-event condition. 
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Figure 1.1 Representative stimuli from Experiment 1. Parallel movies alternated between two 
events (shown: using a vending machine and sharpening a pencil) or between one event and a 
temporally matched blank screen. Misordered sequences swapped the order of sequential actions 
within one event (shown: selecting a pencil in Shot 5 before grabbing a pencil pack in Shot 7)  
 
Stimuli 
 Twelve video stimuli taken from Hymel, Levin and Baker (2015) were modified into two 
conditions (Figure 1.1). In the parallel condition, Adobe Premiere 6 was used to edit 12 events 
into 6 parallel sequences. Parallel sequences alternated events by each shot, in an ABAB fashion. 
Each paired sequence was edited into correct and misordered versions. Correct sequences 
presented each event in correct temporal order. Misordered sequences reversed the temporal 
order of one of the events (e.g., A1, B1, A2, B2, A4, B3, A3, B4…). Only one event was 
misordered at a time. Each edit was separated by 2 black frames (67 ms), to prevent potential 
illusory motion due to overlap of actions across shots (as did Hymel, Levin & Baker, 2015; 
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notably, performance was unaffected by removing these frames). Sequences in the single-event, 
blank condition were identical to the parallel sequences, except that observers saw a temporally 
matched black screen instead of a second event (e.g., A1, __, A2, __, A3…). Sequences were 
edited without sound. Correct and misordered sequences were made for each of the twelve 
events. 
 
Procedure 
 Upon giving consent, participants were randomly assigned to either the parallel or the 
single-event conditions. Participants were told they would watch “videos of people performing 
everyday actions. For instance, a ‘drinking soda’ video might show a woman opening a 
refrigerator, grabbing a can, closing the fridge door, opening the can and sipping the drink.” 
They were then told to “report whether you think an action occurs out of order. So if the woman 
in our soda movie drank from the can before opening it, you would say the action was out of 
order.” Participants in the parallel condition were additionally told that they would watch two 
sequences at a time, and to respond if an action in either sequence occurred out of order. 
 Participants watched 6 sequences: 3 misordered and 3 correctly ordered. Participants 
were given a two-alternative forced choice response to the question, “Were any actions in that 
sequence out of order?” All combinations of condition, video and ordering were counterbalanced 
across the entire experiment. 
 
Table 1.1. Summary results from Experiment 1. Items in parentheses denote 95% confidence 
intervals. Signal discrimination was calculated from the entire sample. 
 
Results 
 Summary results are shown in Table 1.1. Participants were significantly less accurate in 
the parallel condition than in the blank condition (t198 = 8.359, p < .001, d = 1.19). Signal 
detection analysis revealed greater discrimination in the blank condition (d’ = 1.55) than in the 
 
Parallel Blank 
N 98 102 
Accuracy 52.0% (±3.2%) 73.5% (±3.9%) 
Hit Rate 20.4% (±5.2%) 54.6% (±6.6%) 
Correct Reject Rate 83.7% (±5.4%) 92.5% (±3.1%) 
Discrimination (d')  0.15  1.55 
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parallel condition (d’ = .15). Accordingly, participants in the blank condition were significantly 
better at correctly detecting misorderings (“hits”, t198 = 7.987, p < .001, d = 1.14) and identifying 
correctly ordered actions (“correct rejects”, t198 = 2.798, p = .005, d = 0.40).  
 
Discussion 
 Participants in Experiment 1 were significantly worse at detecting misordered actions 
when viewing events in parallel. Importantly, participants in the blank condition still only 
detected roughly half of the misordered actions in the videos while generating relatively few 
false alarms, thus replicating performance in Hymel, Levin & Baker (2015). Furthermore, errors 
in detecting target action pairs cannot be attributed to an inability to see the target, as Hymel, 
Baker & Levin (2015) found that participants can accurately detect any action in these sequences 
if cued before viewing. These results support the claim that event perception is a capacity limited 
process, and that tracking two events in parallel reduces the detail of encoding during event 
perception. 
 The results of Experiment 1 may stem from either a lack of perceptual continuity between 
actions, attentional load as participants shift between sequences, or working memory load as 
participants attempt to represent ongoing activity from both sequences. According to the 
perceptual continuity hypothesis outlined in the introduction, individuals may use relatively 
simple perceptual transients to assess the continuity of objects, actions and spatial relationships 
between shots. This continuity is broken in the blank condition when the flow of action or 
relative space is interrupted in an otherwise seamless presentation between views, leading to 
detection of misordered actions. Meanwhile, alternation between sequences in the parallel 
condition eliminated direct comparison between shots of the same sequence, thus reducing the 
ability to detect misordered actions. According to the perceptual continuity hypothesis, the 
parallel condition did not reduce awareness because of attentional shifting or working memory 
load; rather, inserting perceptual information from another event disrupted comparison of the 
target misordered pair of shots. Experiment 2 therefore tested whether the deleterious effects of 
parallel events are due to disruption of perceptual continuity. 
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Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 controlled for perceptual continuity when viewing single or parallel events 
by modifying the videos from Experiment 1 to always present critical misordered actions in 
pairs. If failures of event perception stem from the discontinuity of actions, objects or spaces 
between actions in a sequence, then participants in the blank condition should miss just as many 
errors as participants in the parallel condition. However, if failures of event perception stem from 
divided attention or working memory load, then participants should be significantly worse in the 
parallel condition. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants (N = 100, 53 male, median age of 28) volunteered via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk website for a $.35 compensation. Power analyses based on Experiment 1 (d = 1.19, post-
hoc Power >.999) indicated that Power of .95 could be achieved with 50 participants. Given the 
minimal costs of Mechanical Turk participation, responses from 100 participants were collected. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the parallel (n = 53) or single-event blank 
condition (n=47).  
 
Stimuli & Procedure 
 The six videos pairs from Experiment 1 were modified so that actions were always 
presented in pairs from the same event. Videos in the parallel condition alternated events in an 
A1-A2-B1-B2 fashion. Reversals resulting in misordered actions were always presented within 
pairs, so that misordered actions were never separated by intervening events (e.g., …A3-A4-B4-
B3-A5-A6…). Videos in the single-event, blank condition were identical to parallel stimuli, with 
the exception that actions from the second event were replaced by temporally matched black 
screens (e.g. A1-A2-__-__-A3-A4…). Edits were once again separated by 2 black frames (67 
ms). Correct and misordered sequences were made for each of the twelve events. The stimuli and 
procedure were otherwise identical to Experiment 1. 
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Results 
 Results closely resembled those from Experiment 1 (Table 1.2). Participants were 
significantly less accurate in the parallel condition than in the blank condition (t99 = 4.213, p < 
.001, d = .85). Signal detection analysis also revealed greater discrimination in the blank 
condition (d’ = 1.29) than in the parallel condition (d’ = .39). Participants in the blank condition 
were again significantly better at correctly detecting misorderings (hits; t99 = 4.893, p < .001, d = 
.99), but were not significantly different in identifying correctly ordered actions (correct rejects; 
t99 = 0.286, p = .775).  
 
 Parallel Blank 
N 53 47 
Accuracy 55.0% (±14.8%) 71.3% (± 6.3%) 
Hit Rate 23.3% (± 7.2%) 54.6% (±10.6%) 
Correct Reject Rate 86.8% (± 5.7%) 87.9% (± 5.4%) 
d'  0.39  1.29 
 
Table 1.2. Summary results from Experiment 2. Items in parentheses denote 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 replicated the finding that viewing multiple events reduces awareness of 
misordered actions. These results rule out a perceptual continuity explanation, as misordered 
actions were preceded by the exact same action in both conditions. These results are consistent 
with a working model hypothesis, which predicts that viewing multiple events inducing working 
memory load, reducing awareness of actions within an event. However, these results are also 
consistent with the attentional shift hypothesis that switching attention between two events 
reduces the depth of encoding during event perception 
 The attentional shift hypothesis suggests that splitting attention between sequences 
reduces awareness of each sequence, similar to an attentional blink, where capture of attention by 
one stimulus promotes inattention to an immediately following stimulus (Raymond, Shapiro & 
Arnell, 1992), or to conceptual masking, where attention to a rapidly presented stimulus (~50-
500 ms) interferes with the encoding of a previously seen stimulus (Potter, 1976; Loftus & Ginn, 
1985; Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006). Experiments 3 and 4 therefore tested whether the deleterious 
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effects of parallel events were due to working memory load or to lapses caused by switching 
attention between sequences of information. 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 replicated the design of Experiment 1 while directing attention to the 
target-containing sequnce. Participants viewed parallel or blank sequences as in Experiment 1. 
Before viewing each stimulus, participants read a prompt that cued them to attend to one 
sequence while ignoring the other. If parallel events induce failures of event perception because 
they split attention between target and distractor events, then cuing participants to the target 
event should reduce or eliminate the effect. However, if viewing two events taxes the working 
memory resources necessary to comprehend events, then awareness should decline in the parallel 
condition even when attention is cued to the target event.  
The design of Experiment 3 additionally controlled for the asymmetry of participant 
responses in the designs of Experiments 1 and 2. Although the relatively high proportion of 
correct rejection trials in earlier experiments suggests that responses were not inflated by 
increased opportunity, it is still true that participants in the blank condition always knew which 
sequence would potentially contain a target misordered pair (i.e., the only sequence visible) 
whereas participants in the parallel condition had no cue indicating which sequence might 
possibly contain the target. Participants in both conditions of Experiment 3 always knew which 
sequence potentially contained the target misordered pair, thus eliminating this confound. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants (N = 200, 101 female, median age of 34) volunteered via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website for a $.35 compensation. Several additional filters were implemented 
to exclude participants who experienced problems with the videos or had previously participated 
in similar experiments (either this study or Hymel, Levin & Baker, 2015). Participants were 
excluded if they 1) reported that the video paused or stopped during the experiment (n = 3), if 
they paused or rewatched any videos during the experiment (n = 10) or if they had previously 
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participated in a similar experiment (n = 3). After exclusion, this left 95 participants in the 
parallel condition and 91 in the blank condition.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
 Experiment 3 used the exact same stimuli and procedure as Experiment 1, with the 
exception that each video was preceded by a short sentence cuing participants to attend to one of 
the sequences and to ignore the other. In the instructions, participants were told “for each video, 
you will be given the title of the sequence that might contain an error.” For example, one stimuli 
read, “Pay attention to the ‘starting a car’ sequence while ignoring the other sequence.” 
Participants were only cued to the sequence containing the misordered action in target-present 
trials. Participants were cued to a random sequence in target-absent trials. Combinations of 
condition, stimuli and cue were counterbalanced across all participants.  
 Parallel Blank 
N 95 91 
Accuracy 64.7% (+/-4.1%) 73.0% (+/-4.2%) 
Hit Rate 38.6% (+/-7.0%) 55.3% (+/-7.2%) 
Correct Reject Rate 88.8% (+/-4.6%) 92.3% (+/-3.4%) 
d'  0.92  1.56 
 
Table 1.3. Summary results from Experiment 3. Participants were cued to the content of the 
target sequence and asked to ignore the distractor. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. 
 
Results 
 Results resembled Experiments 1 and 2 (Table 1.3). Participants were significantly less 
accurate in the parallel condition than in the blank condition (t1184 = 3.356, p < .001, d = .45). 
Signal detection analysis also revealed greater discrimination in the blank condition (d’ = 1.560) 
than in the parallel condition (d’ = 0.925). Participants in the blank condition were significantly 
better at correctly detecting misordered actions (hits; t184 = 3.354, p = .001, d = .48), but were no 
different in identifying correctly ordered actions (correct rejects; t184 = 1.213, p = .227). 
 Further analyses tested whether cuing participants to target events in Experiment 3 
increased detection above the no-cue baseline of Epxeriment 1. Participants in the parallel 
condition of Experiment 3 detected significantly more misordered actions than participants in the 
parallel condition of Experiment 1 (hits; t191 = 4.035, p < .001, d = .60). However, participants in 
the parallel condition of Experiment 3 still detected significantly more misordered actions than 
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participants in the blank condition of Experiment 1 (hits; t195 = 3.318, p = .001, d = .47). There 
were no differences between the blank conditions of Experiments 1 and 3 (t195 = .148, p = .882). 
 
Discussion 
Participants in Experiment 3 detected fewer misordered actions when viewing two events 
in parallel, even when they were explicitly told which sequence potentially contained a target 
misordered action. This supports the proposal that events are encoded automatically in working 
memory, and that increasing the number of events increases working memory load, resulting in 
reduced awareness. However, it is interesting that participants in the parallel condition of 
Experiment 3 performed better than those in the parallel condition of Experiment 1. It is possible 
that failures of event perception in the parallel condition of Experiment 1 were due in part to 
dividing attention between two sequences. However, it is possible that the cue in Experiment 3 
was insufficient in directing attention to one sequence over the other, and that a more salient cue 
might eliminate differences between blank and parallel conditions altogether. Experiment 4 
tested whether a salient perceptual cue further mediated event perception in parallel sequences. 
 
Experiment 4 
The results of Experiment 3 in part support an attentional shift hypothesis, which predicts 
that event perception requires sustained attention, and that dividing attention between parallel 
events leads to failures of event perception. However, it is possible that the conceptual cue to the 
event containing a misordered action was too underspecified to adequately draw attention to the 
target sequence. Participants may have had attend to each shot long enough to determine if it was 
part of the target event, generating sufficient attentional load to reduce perception of misordered 
pairs. To account for this, Experiment 4 used a salient perceptual cue to indicate the sequence 
potentially containing a target event. If parallel events constrain event perception because they 
divide attention between target and distractor events, then perceptually cuing participants to the 
target event should reduce or eliminate the effect. However, if viewing two events taxes the 
working memory resources necessary for awareness, then awareness should decline in the 
parallel condition even when attention is cued to the target event.  
 
  
		 19	
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants (N = 208, 108 male, median age of 32) volunteered via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website for a $.35 compensation. Participants were excluded if they 1) reported 
that the video paused or stopped during the experiment (n = 4), if they paused or rewatched any 
videos during the experiment (n = 24) or if they had previously participated in a similar 
experiment (n = 12). After exclusion, this left 87 participants in the parallel condition and 83 in 
the blank condition.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
 Experiment 4 followed the exact procedure of Experiment 3 with one exception. Instead 
of cuing participants to the target-containing sequence with a text prompt before the video, 
target-containing sequences in the parallel and blank conditions were bounded by a 100-pixel red 
stripe on the top and bottom of the screen. Target-absent sequences (with correctly ordered 
actions) in the parallel condition and temporally matched black screens in the blank condition 
were never bounded by red stripes. A random sequence was bounded in target-absent trials. 
Stimuli were counterbalanced for bounded target-present events, bounded target-absent events 
and condition across all participants.  
 
 Parallel Blank 
N 87 83 
Accuracy 60.5% (+/-4.4%) 71.7% (+/-4.1%) 
Hit Rate 34.1% (+/-7.5%) 50.6% (+/-5.7%) 
Correct Reject Rate 87.0% (+/-7.4%) 92.8% (+/-3.4%) 
d'  0.71  1.47 
 
Table 1.4. Summary results from Experiment 4. Target sequences were indicated by red stripes 
bounding the frame. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. 
 
Results 
 Results were nearly identical to Experiment 3 (Table 1.4). Participants were significantly 
less accurate in the parallel condition than in the blank condition (t168 = 3.613, p < .001, d = .56). 
Signal detection analysis also revealed greater discrimination in the blank condition (d’ = 1.474) 
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than in the parallel condition (d’ = .715). Participants in the parallel condition were significantly 
worse at correctly detecting misordered actions (hits; t168 = 3.045, p = .002, d = .47), and were 
marginally worse at identifying correctly ordered actions (correct rejects; t168 = 1.721, p = .087, 
d = .27).  
 Differences between experiments were then analyzed. A 3 (Cue: No Cue [Exp. 1], 
Conceptual Cue [Exp. 2], or Perceptual Cue [Exp. 3]) by 2 (Condition: Parallel or Blank) 
between-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Cue (F2,555 = 3.656, p = .027, ηp2 = 
.013) and Condition (F2,555 = 66.127, p < .001, ηp2 = .106), with a significant interaction effect 
(F2,555 = 4.444, p < .012, ηp2 = .016). Paired comparisons controlling for false discovery rate 
using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) revealed that 
participants detected significantly fewer misordered actions in the parallel conditions of all three 
cue types (t559 = 8.006, p <.001, d = .67). Paired comparisons between the parallel conditions of 
each cue type revealed that participants detected significantly fewer misordered actions with No 
Cue than with a Conceptual Cue (t191 = 4.035, p <.001, d = .58) or Perceptual Cue (t185 = 4.038, p 
<.001, d = .59), but there was no difference between Conceptual and Perceptual Cues (t182 = 
.874, p = .383). Detection in Blank conditions did not differ by cue type (t < .34, p > .38).  
 
Discussion 
 Participants in Experiment 3 and 4 detected significantly fewer misordered actions when 
viewing two events in parallel, even when explicitly told to attend to one event and ignore the 
other. The results of Experiment 3 and 4 were virtually identical. However, it is interesting to 
note that both experiments yielded significantly greater detection of misordered actions in 
parallel trials than in Experiment 1. Cuing participants to the sequence containing the target 
misordered action appears to mediate some of the deficits incurred by viewing parallel events. 
Despite this, participants were less aware of sequence errors in parallel conditions, supporting 
the hypothesis that event perception automatically recruits working memory to comprehend and 
track events, and that viewing multiple events induces working memory load. These results 
suggest that event perception requires both working memory and focused attention. 
 Two modifications to Experiment 4 may shed more light on the role of focused attention 
in event perception. The perceptual cues in Experiment 4 appeared at the onset of each shot in 
the cued sequence, and may have insufficiently prepared participants to attend. Furthermore, the 
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speed of stimulus presentation may have increased the difficulty of the task. Participant 
performance might improve if cue onset occurred 10 frames (~333 ms) before shot onset, giving 
participants adequate time to attend to or ignore the upcoming action. If event perception 
automatically recruits working memory, then parallel events should impair event perception 
event in this modified cuing procedure. Though intriguing, this experiment will be held to future 
investigation. 
 
Experiment 5 
Experiments 1-4 demonstrated that tracking multiple events in parallel impedes event 
perception. It is hypothesized that viewing parallel events increases working memory load, 
reducing the capacity to encode features in either event. Previous research has demonstrated that 
working memory load from a secondary task decreases awareness of visual properties (de 
Fockert, Rees, Frith & Lavie, 2014). Participants in this prior experiment detected fewer oddballs 
from a rapid serial visual presentation task when they encoded a difficult sequence of numbers in 
working memory (e.g., “0,3,1,2,4”) rather than an easy sequence of numbers (e.g., “0,1,2,3,4”). 
Following this, Experiment 5 directly tested the effect of external working memory load on event 
perception. Participants watched each stimulus video while holding some number of objects in 
working memory. If event perception requires working memory, then individuals under high 
load should detect fewer misordered actions. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants (N = 136, 77 male, median age of 31.5) volunteered via Mechanical Turk for 
a $.35 compensation. Participants were excluded if they 1) reported that video playback stopped 
during the experiment (n = 5), if they paused or re-watched any videos during the experiment (n 
= 6) or if they had previously participated in a similar experiment (n = 4). Four participants were 
excluded from analysis for missing all questions on the working memory task. After exclusion, 
this left 56 participants in the high load condition and 62 in the low load condition.  
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Stimuli and Procedure 
 Experiment 5 used the 12 edited sequences used in Hymel, Levin & Baker, 2015. Unlike 
Experiments 1-4, these videos were not edited into parallel or blank versions. Otherwise stimuli 
were identical to those used in the previous studies. Participants were instructed to identify 
misordered actions in the stimuli. Participants were additionally informed that they would 
memorize a display of some number of colored squares before each movie (Figure 1.2). Once 
the movie finished, they would identify which of the two squares swapped positions. Participants 
then completed two practice working memory trials with feedback before beginning the 
experiment.  
 
Figure 1.2. Representative high and low working memory load trials. Participants memorized 
the colors of squares in five locations prior to watching each video (Learning phase). 
Participants selected which two locations changed colors in the Test phase (squares 2 and 4 
above). 
 
Experimental trials began with a WM learning phase, followed by stimulus video 
presentation and forced-choice target misordering detection, and then ending with a WM test 
phase. Participants in the High WM condition saw five uniquely colored 100x100 pixel squares 
evenly displayed about a central 75x75 pixel fixation cross. Participants in the Low WM 
condition saw a display with the exact same properties, with the critical difference that only one 
square was colored. Participants memorized the learning display for five seconds before viewing 
a test video depicting a single event across several cuts, with two black frames (67 ms) 
separating each shot. Immediately following the video, participants responded whether they 
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detected a misordered action in the clip. They then saw the WM test image and selected which 
two boxes swapped position using a drop-down menu. Participants were only scored as correct if 
they identified both of the squares that swapped colors. Participants repeated this procedure 
through all 12 videos, which were randomly presented and counterbalanced for target presence 
across participants.  
 
 High Load Low Load 
N* 56 62 
WM Accuracy 82.3% (± 6.7%) 93.1% (± 2.7%) 
Accuracy 63.2% (± 4.2%) 65.7% (± 2.8%) 
Hit Rate 37.4% (± 7.5%) 37.4% (± 5.7%) 
Correct Reject Rate 92.8% (± 4.4%) 94.1% (± 2.6%) 
d'  1.22  1.32 
 
Table 1.5. Summary results from Experiment 4. Participants detected misordered actions from 
single event sequences under high or low working memory load. 95% confidence intervals in 
parentheses. Target detection analysis was limited to working memory accurate trials. 
 
Results 
 Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.5. Accuracy in the working memory task 
validated the difficulty of the measure. Participants correctly identified significantly more color-
locations changes in the low load condition than in the high load condition (t116 = 3.663, p < 
.001, d = .67). Detection of misordered actions was calculated for trials with correct working 
memory responses. There were no significant differences in overall accuracy in the misordered 
action detection task (t116 = 1.020, p = .310), nor were there significant differences in target 
detection (t116 = 0.006, p = .995) or correct rejection (t116 = 0.479, p = .632).  
 Results from Experiment 5 were then compared to Experiment 1. A one-way ANOVA 
coding condition as a between-subjects factor revealed a significant difference in hit rate (F3,313 = 
25.602, p < .001, η2 = .186). Paired comparisons corrected using the Benjamini-Hochberg 
procedure revealed that participants in the parallel viewing condition were significantly worse 
than participants in both the high load (t152 = -3.257, p <.001, d = .53) and low load (t159 = -
3.906, p <.001, d = .62) conditions. Furthermore, participants in the blank viewing condition 
performed significantly better than participants in the high load (t156 = 3.899, p <.001, d = .601) 
and low load (t163 = 3.252, p <.001, d = .501) conditions.  
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Discussion 
 Experiment 5 tested whether increasing magnitudes of working memory load would 
impair event perception. Results suggest that there were no differences in detection of 
misordered actions whether participants sustained high or low working memory load. However, 
comparison with the results of Experiment 1 suggests that both high and low load conditions 
reduced awareness below a no-load baseline. Conversely, awareness of misordered actions was 
far lower when viewing parallel events in Experiment 1 than during either working memory load 
condition of Experiment 5. These results suggest that taxing working memory decreases 
awareness of events, but that switching between events exacerbates this effect. These results 
support both the working model and attentional shift hypotheses. 
 A further consideration should be the degree to which this design manipulated working 
memory rather than short term memory. As discussed above, the present task was adapted from a 
previous working memory task used to induce visual inattention (de Fockert et al, 2001). 
However, participants in Experiment 5 updated of object locations rather than item positions in a 
list, to better compare task load in this experiment with the visual load presumably generated by 
parallel visual events. Rather than generating working memory load, the visual nature of the task 
may have been within the span of visual short term memory (Todd & Maroi, 2004), which has 
been demonstrated to have a capacity of around 4-5 objects (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004). A task 
requiring participants to maintain and update information in working memory across trials might 
lead to differences between conditions. Such a manipulation would be more akin to the verbal 
overshadowing task used by Hymel, Levin & Baker (2015) to reduce detection of sequence 
errors. 
 
General Discussion 
 I have demonstrated in five experiments that event perception requires working memory 
and focused attention. Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were significantly worse at detecting 
impossibly misordered actions when viewing two events in parallel. Experiments 3 and 4 
replicated this effect, even when participants were cued to the specific sequence containing the 
target misordered action. Interestingly, cuing attention to a specific sequence moderated some of 
the deficits incurred from viewing parallel events. Experiment 5 revealed that any degree of 
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working memory load held throughout viewing decreased awareness below performance in 
Experiment 1, although there were no differences between high and low load.  
These results, particularly from Experiments 2 and 5, rule out the plausibility of the 
perceptual continuity hypothesis of event awareness, where moment-to-moment awareness is 
determined by detection of discontinuous objects, actions and spaces within a stream of activity. 
Such a hypothesis would predict that participants would perceive events as continuous so long as 
objects, actions and their spatial relationships are held intact between views. Detection of 
misordered events would stem from between-view comparisons of object and spatial motion. As 
detection of misordered actions was unaffected by showing target actions in unbroken pairs 
within a parallel sequence in Experiment 1, it is unlikely that event perception is sustained by 
moment-to-moment evaluation of perceptual continuity. 
The results of Experiments 3, 4 and 5 add credibility to both the attentional shift and 
working model hypotheses. According to the former, event awareness requires sustained 
attention to a single sequence of events; when attention is divided, the viewer is less likely to 
notice impossible events. Meanwhile, the working model hypothesis predicts that event 
comprehension is rooted in the encoding and comparison of relevant properties in a working 
memory model of the current situation, and that increasing the number of events held in working 
memory should reduce awareness of individual actions. Both of these hypotheses proved to have 
merit. Individuals appear to encode information relevant to comprehension of ongoing events in 
working memory. Monitoring multiple events decreases the amount of information available for 
each in event as working memory reaches capacity, while dividing attention may reduce the 
quality of information encoded in the first place. 
 
Future Directions 
Experiment 5 demonstrated that any form of working memory load reduced awareness 
below the single event control of Experiment 1. Another experiment should be run to directly 
compare awareness between a single set of observers using identical stimuli, as the blank 
condition of Experiment 1 had substantially different timing between shots than the stimuli used 
in Experiment 5. As these results stand, it is possible that simply spacing the presentation of 
information between shots increases awareness, although it is notable that participants in the 
blank condition of Experiment 1 demonstrated similar rates of detection as found in Hymel, 
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Levin & Baker (2015), whose rates of presentation mirrored those of Experiment 5. In addition 
to this replication, several future experiments are required to fully test the role of working 
memory on awareness of parallel events. 
Experiment 5 differed from earlier experiments in that the detection task was entirely 
enveloped by the load task, as opposed to alternating with a second event. The effect of 
diminished awareness under this load task should be directly compared with a similar overlap in 
the display of events. Viewers may maintain an unfinished event model, much like the classic 
Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1938), wherein unfinished tasks linger in working memory. In this 
hypothetical experiment, participants would watch half of event A followed by all of event B and 
concluded by the remainder of event A. If participants detect fewer misordered actions in Event 
B if it is bounded by a distractor event than if event B is bounded by blank frames, then it is 
possible that the incomplete event is taxing working memory.  
Experiments 3 and 4 further suggest that participants may automatically attend to and 
encode events as they are presented, even when explicitly instructed to ignore the distractor 
event. One outstanding question is the degree to which participants comprehend the ignored 
event. In a follow-up of the attentional cuing experiments, participants could be cued to one 
event and instructed to ignore the parallel event. Participants would be tested on their detection 
of misordered actions in the cued event for the first five trials, and on the last trial be tested for 
their detection of a misordered action in the distractor event. To prevent potential demand 
characteristics from this single-trial experiment (where participants may feel tempted to report a 
misordered event so as not to appear “fooled”), this experiment will require participants to 
respond in a few words exactly what occurred out of order. In addition, participants would 
briefly summarize both events to test whether any comprehension of the ignored event 
penetrated awareness. If some level of event perception occurs automatically, then at least some 
participants should be aware of the parallel ignored event.  
One final way to test whether that ignored distractor sequences induce working memory 
load is to compare parallel events with a condition that alternates a single event with the same 
shot of an unrelated action (e.g., a reach or throw) repeated between each shot of the target event 
(e.g., A1, B1, A2, B1, A3, B1…). If it is truly comprehension of the distractor event that induces 
load and reduces awareness, then repeating a meaningless action between shots should not 
reduce detection of misordered actions. However, if failures of event perception stem from a 
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shift of attention to salient motion, then meaningless repeated parallel actions should interrupt 
detection of misordered actions just as much as viewing an entirely different event. 
 
Summary & Conclusions 
 In five experiments, I have demonstrated that event perception requires both focused 
attention and limited working memory resources using a novel measure of event comprehension.  
This study is the first to directly the cognitive limitations of event perception. These results leave 
open a great deal of future research inquiries which test questions of automaticity, domain-
generality and capacity in our perception of the real world. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE LIMITS OF DEFAULT PERSPECTIVE TAKING: MULTIPLE AGENTS AND 
ATTENTIONAL SETS 
 
Abstract 
 Several researchers have now proposed that humans have a rapid, default and early-
developing system for encoding another’s perspective. Proponents of this theoretical system 
claim that the processing costs incurred when another agent holds a different perspective are due 
to an automatic calculation of that agent’s perspective. However, detractors note that such 
behaviors might stem from domain-general cognitive abilities. It is therefore imperative to 
understand the exact circumstances under which other’s perspectives affect cognition. In five 
experiments I investigate perspective taking in scenes containing multiple agents and attentional 
sets. If processing costs associated with default perspective-taking stem from representation of 
each unique perspective in a scene, then participants should display increasing processing costs 
as the number of conflicting perspectives increases. However, Experiments 1a, 1b and 2 found 
equal processing costs when any number of agents held a different perspective. Experiments 3a 
and 3b then demonstrated that another’s perspective only influences behavior after participant 
selection of an attentional set. These experiments demonstrate that default perspective-taking is 
not a calculation of every available mental state. Rather, this system may be a heuristic signal 
that one has privileged access to an attended set of objects. 
 
Introduction 
When we debate politics, play sports or plan for retirement, we are putting aside our 
current mental state and adopting the perspective of someone else, be it a colleague, a competitor 
or a future version of ourselves. Although researchers have historically demonstrated perspective 
taking to be cognitively taxing and error prone (Lin, Epley & Keysar, 2010), recent findings 
suggest that observers may use limited forms of another’s visual perspective by default to 
efficiently guide action in social situations (Kovacs, Teglas & Endres, 2010). Several theories 
posit that this early system functions in parallel with the effortful processes associated with more 
complex perspective taking (Leslie, Friedman & German, 2005; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), 
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whereas others claim that existing experiments hinge on domain-general cognitive abilities 
(Heyes, 2014; Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird & Heyes, 2014; Catmur, Santiesteban, 
Conway, Heyes & Bird, 2016). The debate on the source of these behaviors can only be settled 
once we understand the exact circumstances in which another’s perspective influences cognition. 
Here, I test whether the processing costs associated with default perspective-taking incorporate 
the perspectives of multiple agents and multiple perspectives of an individual agent. In doing so, 
I demonstrate that default perspective taking arises when any agent has a different line of sight 
access to an attended set of objects. These behaviors suggest a decision making heuristic that 
one’s own visuospatial access is privileged. This heuristic likely arises after attentional selection.   
A robust literature has documented the apparent limitations of mental state reasoning in 
children and adults. Seminal observations in cognitive development revealed that children 
younger than four or five demonstrate a remarkable inability to imagine a scene from a different 
perspective (Piaget & Inhelder, 1958) or suppress their own knowledge when thinking about 
other’s mental states (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Although children consistently improve on 
perspective-taking tasks starting around age four, research suggests that even adults suffer from 
persistent egocentrism, default inability to consider another’s mental state as different from one’s 
own (Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004). Research suggests that theory of mind ability is 
highly correlated with working memory capacity, finding that participants show more egocentric 
errors when making rapid responses (Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003), under cognitive load (Lin, 
Keysar & Epley, 2010), or even when simply unmotivated (Klein & Hodges, 2001). Many 
researchers thus concluded that theory of mind was late-developing, cognitively taxing and 
egocentric. 
Despite the frequent errors seen in adults, infants as young as five months have 
demonstrated tacit understanding of goals, intentions and beliefs. Infants respond to visual 
changes in perceived goals (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), can detect animate movement in 
nonliving things (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005), and differentiate intentional from nonintentional 
actions (Tomasello et al., 2005). Perhaps most striking, however, is the success of many infants 
in false belief tasks often considered the gold standard of mental state reasoning. Kovacs, 
Teglass and Endress (2010) had five-month-old infants watch a short film of a cartoon agent 
entering a room with a ball. The cartoon agent then watched the ball stay in place or move 
behind an occluder. After the agent left, the ball would then move behind a second occluder or 
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stay in the same location. The agent then returned and the occluders were removed. Infant 
looking times and adult response times both increased when the ball appeared in a location that 
was inconsistent with either the participant’s or the agent’s beliefs. A second paradigm geared 
for adults further suggested that individuals may generate basic representations of other’s 
perspectives by default. In Samson et al’s dot-perspective task (2011), participants were 
instructed to take their own perspective or the perspective of a cartoon agent. Participants then 
responded whether that perspective could see a given number of objects in the range of 
subitization (i.e., 0-3; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). Participants across numerous replications have 
demonstrated slower and more error prone responses when the agent’s perspective is inconsistent 
with the participant’s perspective (McCleery et al, 2011; Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 2010; 
Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Scott, 2010; Samson & Apperly, 2010; Surtees & 
Apperly, 2012; Mattan, Rosthein & Quinn, 2016; Surtees, Samson & Apperly, 2016; Surtees, 
Apperly & Samson, 2016; Baker, Levin & Saylor, 2016), even when participants were only 
asked to take their own perspective (Experiment 2 of Samson et al, 2011).  
 
Two Systems for Perspective-Taking? 
To reconcile the apparent success of infants in perspective-taking tasks previously 
thought difficult even for mature adults, researchers have proposed two-system theories of 
mental state representation (e.g., Fodor, 1992; Leslie, Friedman & German, 2004; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, among many 
others). According to these theories, an early-developing default system selectively guides 
awareness to the presence of another’s differing perspective. After this early system identifies 
another perspective, a later developing, cognitively effortful system can represent the differences 
between self and other perspectives1. Apperly and Butterfill have analogized these dual 
processes to number cognition, where an early-developing domain-specific module processes 
number-like properties such as relative magnitude and density while a later-developing domain-
general process effortfully organizes information using mathematics knowledge. A two-system 
theory of perspective taking potentially reconciles conflicts between adult and infant theory of 
																																																								
1 To prevent confusion, I follow the precedent of Apperly & Butterfill and refer to these systems 
as the early and late systems. The increases in response time delays and errors related to the early 
system are referred to collectively as processing costs. 
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mind research and opens new alternatives for the longstanding debate between theories of 
domain specificity or generality in theory of mind.  
Many experiments explicitly suggest that these behaviors constitute a default 
representation of another’s perspective (e.g., McCleery et al, 2011; Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 
2010; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Scott, 2010; Samson & Apperly, 2010; Surtees 
& Apperly, 2012). The initial thought was that such a modular system would be specific to living 
agents (Samson et al, 2010). However, several experiments revealed processing costs when 
displays used arrows instead of avatars (Heyes, 2014; Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird & Heyes, 
2014; Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird & Heyes, 2014), leading to the suggestion that the 
effect stemmed from low-level spatial cuing, of the type seen with gaze-following experiments 
(Friesen, Kingstone & Ristic, 2004). However, processing costs persist when an agent’s visual 
access to targets is manipulated using occluders rather than avatar location and orientation 
(Baker, Levin, & Saylor, 2016). This suggests that the early system monitors line-of-sight visual 
access, and that effects are not artifacts stemming from spatial cues of attention. Even taken with 
the most conservative interpretation, participants appear to rapidly adapt their behavior when an 
alternative perspective arises, even when ignoring the other agent would be beneficial. 
 
The Current Study 
Given that research has repeatedly demonstrated rapid and default detection of 
inconsistent perspectives, the goal of future research must be to define the mechanisms 
underlying this behavior. At this point, researchers posit that the early system is present by at 
least 5 months of age (Kovacs, Teglas & Endress, 2010) and is characterized by preferential 
representation of objects (e.g., Samson et al, 2010) within line-of sight visuospatial access of an 
agent (Baker, Levin & Saylor, 2016). In the current experiment, I test two critical assumptions of 
the default system of perspective taking: that processing costs stem from automatic 
representation of all other perspectives, and that this default representation directs attention to 
inconsistent perspectives. This study tested the limits of the early system to respond to multiple 
perspectives or multiple possible attentional sets from a single perspective. If participants incur 
increasing processing costs with the inclusion of additional agents, then participants might be 
representing multiple distinct perspectives. However, if participants demonstrate the same costs 
to any number of differing perspectives, then the early system may be more of a signal of 
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privileged access to a scene rather than representation of an entirely different perspective from a 
different viewpoint. This signal would be more akin to a spatial grouping of a scene by an 
agent’s line-of sight than to a robust representation of the agent’s mental state.  
Furthermore, if the default system operates as an “efficient” subsystem of theory of mind 
that functions “to guide young children’s attention to cases in which [participants’] epistemic 
perspective diverges from that of someone else” (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), then the system 
should function as an exogenous cue of attention that signals when any object appears in contrast 
to another’s perspective. I therefore tested whether participants incur processing costs when an 
agent holds a different perspective of objects that the participant is trying to ignore. If the early 
system selectively guides attention to another’s restricted perspective, then participants should 
incur costs when an agent has a different perspective of any set of objects, even those outside of 
the current attentional set. 
 
Experiment 1 
Human social interaction regularly involves events containing dozens or even hundreds 
of other agents. There are two ways in which the default system may process multiple 
perspectives. If the default system represents every available perspective (as suggested by Leslie, 
Friedman & German, 2004), then every additional perspective should incur a processing cost. On 
the other hand, the default system may be indiscriminately sensitive to any deviation from one’s 
own perspective. According to this hypothesis, the early system operates as a heuristic cue that 
any other agent in the scene has limited visuospatial access. This system would fall short of full 
perspective-taking, as participants would not need complete representation of the objects, angles 
and occlusions available to all other agents. Rather, participants would only calculate 
obstructions within one’s own perspective that might limit another’s perspective. Thus the early 
system would be an indicator of privileged knowledge, a heuristic signal of divided space. 
Experiments 1 and 2 used a previously validated modification of the dot-perspective task 
(Experiment 2 of Baker, Levin & Saylor, 2016) to test the effect of multiple conflicting 
perspectives on processing costs. Participants responded whether they or another agent could see 
a number of targets within a scene (Figure 2.1). If early-system perspective taking involves 
complete representation of a relevant agent’s perspective, then we should see increasing 
processing costs with the addition of more diverging perspectives in a scene. However, if the 
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early system operates categorically by signaling whether objects may be unseen by any agent, 
then processing costs in inconsistent perspective situations should be relatively unaffected by the 
inclusion of additional agents.  
Whereas previous versions of this design had two classes of perspective conflict (Self and 
Other perspectives which were Consistent or Inconsistent with the participant), this design 
affords conditions of perspective-taking leading to three principled hypotheses (Figure 2.2). 
According to an egocentric deviation hypothesis, seeing any perspective different from one’s 
own causes interference. In this case, interference is not due to representation of another’s 
perspective per se, but sensitivity to any perspective that differs from egocentric knowledge. 
Thus, one differing perspective would cause the same processing cost as two differing 
perspectives. We would conclude that the default system is largely categorical, calculating 
whether one’s own perspective is inaccessible from any other perspective. 
It is also possible that the early system represents multiple perspectives individually, 
which would consequently increase processing costs as a function of the number of discrete 
perspectives in the scene. Two hypotheses may be generated from this possibility. According to 
an individuation-convergence hypothesis, the early system detects multiple perspectives and 
represents their intersection. Thus, multiple perspectives that differ from one’s own to the same 
degree (as with Figure 2.2b, when you see three targets but both avatars see 1) might increase 
interference beyond a single differing perspective (Figure 2.2c). To put another way, the early 
system weighs each perspective equally; observers demonstrate greater processing costs when 
their own perspectives are outweighed by the combination of two conflicting perspectives. In a 
similar vein, an individuation-divergence hypothesis would predict that the early system 
individuates perspectives and attention is drawn to regions of conflicting perspectives. In this 
case, interference should increase with contrasting perspectives. In the case of Figure 2.2d, the 
participant’s perspective differs from the avatars’ perspectives in two ways, the male avatar 
seeing one and the female avatar seeing two. This might trigger the early system twice, 
effectively generating load from representing three diverging perspectives at once. Either the 
individuation-convergence or the individuation-divergence hypothesis would suggest a default 
system that can not only rapidly individuate multiple perspectives, but also represent their 
contents additively.  
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Figure 2.1 Design of all experiments. Participants responded whether the perspective cued could 
see the number of objects cued in the display (“match” trials shown).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Schematic of conditions and hypotheses for Experiments 1 & 2. X’s denote expected 
magnitude of increased response time and error rates above baseline in Self-perspective trials.  
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Method 
 
Participants 
 Twenty-four Vanderbilt University undergraduates participated for class credit (mean age 
= 19.0, 18 Female, all right-handed). All participants throughout this study were treated in 
compliance with IRB approval and APA ethical standards.  
Stimuli 
Stimuli were created with the 3D editing software, Blender (v2.66; The Blender 
Foundation, www.blender.org, 2015), using cartoon avatars downloaded from an open source 
file-sharing site (VMComix, 2011). The stimuli were reproduced following the method described 
in Baker, Levin & Saylor (2015; Experiment 2), which replicated Samson et al (2010) using 
occlusion to vary avatars’ visual access to targets rather than avatar direction. This experiment 
changed the design to incorporate a second cartoon agent. The agents, one male and one female, 
appeared on either side of the display. The respective location of the agents was fixed, with the 
male on the right and the female on the left, to prevent potential search costs or training effects. 
Test images consisted of a 3-dimensional room with up to three blue target spheres 
flanked by two agents. Two walls appeared between the agents and the targets. Each wall was 
segmented into three subunits each, for a total of six possible occluders (Figure 2.1). In all cases, 
the participant could see all of the displayed dots, while the avatars could see varying numbers of 
dots depending on wall position.  
Twenty stimulus images were created in four experimental categories, for a total of 80 
test images. In Consistent images (Figure 2.2a), the participant and both avatars were able to see 
the same number of targets. Three sets of Inconsistent perspective types were created. In the Self-
Other Inconsistent condition (Figure 2.2b), both avatars saw the same number of targets but 
were inconsistent with the participant’s view (e.g., you see 3, male avatar sees 2, female sees 2). 
In the Partial Inconsistent condition (Figure 2.2c), one of the avatars saw the same number of 
targets as the participant while the other saw fewer targets (e.g., you see 2, male sees 1, female 
sees 2). The consistent perspective was counterbalanced across the 20 trials, so that each avatar 
was consistent with the participants’ perspective on half of trials. In the All Inconsistent 
condition (Figure 2.2d), both avatars saw a different number of targets than the participant and 
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from each other (e.g., you see 3, male sees 1, female sees 2). The number of targets seen by each 
avatar was counterbalanced, so that the female saw more targets than the male on half of trials.  
Six unique cue sets were created for each image, again following the method of Samson 
et al. (2011). Participants first viewed a perspective cue that either primed the participant’s 
perspective (Self trials: “YOU”) or one of the avatars’ perspectives (Other trials: “HIM” or 
“HER”). Participants next saw a number cue, which either aligned with the perspective cued 
(Matched) or were did not align with the perspective cued (Mismatched). Critically, Mismatched 
trials for Inconsistent images displayed the number of targets seen by an irrelevant perspective. 
Mismatched trials from one of the Other perspectives corresponded with the number of objects 
participant’s perspective, while mismatched trials from the participant’s perspective 
corresponded with the number of objects seen by one of the avatars. Take the example of an 
image where the male and female avatars see two targets but the participant sees three targets (as 
in Figure 2.2b). In a Self-Matching trial, the cues would be “YOU” and “3”, but in Self-
Mismatching trials, the cues would be “YOU” and “2”.  
It is worth noting that number cues for Mismatching trials in All-Consistent displays did 
not correspond with any perspective. In these situations, a random number generator was used to 
select a number between zero and three that did not correspond with any perspective. All 
participants viewed the same randomly generated number for mismatching trials on individual 
All-Consistent displays. Previous studies have viewed Mismatching-Consistent trials as fillers, as 
the number cues generate no conflict with any potential representation (Samson, Apperly, 
Braithwaite, Andrews & Scott, 2010; Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 2010, McCleery et al, 2011; 
Surtees & Apperly, 2012). However, such exclusion criteria might bias results towards false 
acceptance of an underpowered effect. Here I follow the logic presented in Baker, Levin & 
Saylor (2016) and analyze results from all trials containing targets. 
 
Procedure 
Upon giving consent, participants completed the entire experiment using the 
psychophysics toolbox for MATLAB (Kleiner, Brainard & Pelli, 2007) on an Apple Mac Mini 
with a 19.5” LCD monitor (1600x900p, 60 Hz). Participants read instructions and then 
completed a tutorial before beginning experimental trials. The tutorial consisted of four practice 
trials, which followed the experimental procedure outlined below. Each practice trial 
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demonstrated a different condition (consistent, self-other inconsistent, partial inconsistent and all 
inconsistent). Practice trials gave feedback and repeated until participants made the correct 
response. The experimenter verbally confirmed that participants understood the tutorial before 
the experiment began. 
Each trial began with a fixation cross for 750 ms followed by a 500 ms blank screen. 
Participants then saw a perspective cue for 750 ms and a second 500 ms blank. They then saw a 
number cue for 750 ms immediately followed by the stimulus. Participants viewed each of the 80 
displays six times, once for each combination of perspective cue (YOU vs. HIM vs. HER) and 
number cue (Matching vs. Mismatching), for a total 480 trials in all. For each display, 
participants responded whether the perspective cued matched the number cued. Trials were 
terminated if participants took longer than 2000ms to respond. Trials were completely 
randomized over six blocks. The entire experiment took a maximum of 40 minutes, but 
participants completed the experiment in 29.7 minutes on average. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Processing costs in Experiment 1 by Perspective cued and Consistency type. 
Participants were slower to respond to their own perspectives (Self) when any combination of 
alternative perspectives differed from their own. Error bars here and throughout the remaining 
experiments represent within-subject standard error using the procedure outlined in O’Brian & 
Cousineau (2014). 
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Results 
Both accuracy and response times were analyzed (Figure 2.3). Unless otherwise stated, 
all tests were two-tailed, performed within-subjects and reflect correction for false discovery rate 
using the Benjamini-Yekutieli-Hochberg method (Benjamini & Yekutieli, 2001). 
Accuracy 
The primary analysis was whether the avatar’s perspective influenced accuracy for Self 
trials. On these critical Self trials, participants were significantly more accurate on All Consistent 
trials than S-O Inconsistent trials (mean difference = 3.6%, t23 = 2.36, p = .014, d = .49) and All 
Inconsistent trials (mean difference = 2.7%, t23 = 2.20, p = .020, d = .46). All Consistent trials 
were not significantly different from Partial Inconsistent trials (mean difference = 0.9%, t23 = 
0.80, p = .216).   
Overall results reveal effects of Perspective and Consistency. A 3 (Perspective) by 4 
(Consistency) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of Perspective (F2,46 = 6.654, ηp2 
= .219, p = .003) and a main effect of Consistency (F3,69 = 11.66, ηp2 = .336, p < .001), as well as 
a Perspective*Consistency interaction effect (F6,138 = 4.638, ηp2 = .168, p < .001). Participants 
were significantly less accurate when taking the male avatar’s (“His”) perspective (93.6% 
accurate) than either the female avatar’s (95.8%; t23 = 1.684, p = .05, d = .35) or their own 
(mean: 96.2%; t23 = 2.308, p = .015, d = .48) perspective (p’s < .002). There was no significant 
difference between Self and Her perspectives (t23 = .309, p = .380). Participants were 
significantly more accurate in the Consistent condition (97.5%) than in the Self-Other 
Inconsistent (94.8; t23 = 4.450, p < .001, d = .928), Partial Inconsistent (94.7; t23 = 4.451, p < 
.001, d = .929) or All Inconsistent trials (94.5%; t23 = 4.311, p < .001, d = .899). There were no 
significant differences between Inconsistent conditions (t23’s < 1.169, p’s >.873) 
 
Response Times 
Again, the critical measure was whether perspective type influenced response times in 
Self trials. Following accuracy results, participants were significantly delayed in Self trials when 
any perspective was inconsistent with their own (all t’s > 1.83, p’s < .05). Inconsistent conditions 
did not differ significantly (all p’s > .45). 
A 3 (Perspective: YOU, HIM, HER) by 4 (Consistency Type) within-subjects ANOVA 
revealed significant main effects of Perspective (F2,23 = 94.12, ηp2 = .804, p < .001) and 
		 39	
Consistency (F3,23 = 31.53, ηp2 = .578, p < .001), as well as a Perspective*Consistency 
interaction (F6,23 = 2.675, ηp2 = .104, p = .017). Consistent with egocentric bias, pairwise 
comparisons revealed that participants were faster when taking their own perspective (mean: 675 
ms) than when taking the perspective of either the male (794 ms; t23 = 9.911, p <.001, d = 2.06) 
or the female avatar (778 ms; t23 = 11.430, p <.001, d = 2.38). Furthermore, responses for each 
Consistency type were significantly different from one another (lowest t23 = 2.353, p < .018) 
with the exception of All Consistent and Partial Inconsistent trials (t23 = .367, p = .358).  
There was a slight tendency for participants to respond faster to the female avatar’s 
perspective than the male’s perspective (mean difference = 16.40 ms, t23 = 2.57 p = .008, d = 
.54). Importantly, there was no difference in Self-perspective, Partial-Inconsistent trials 
depending on which avatar saw the same number of targets as the participant (t23 = .363, ns). 
There were no interactions of participant sex with any experimental conditions (F1,23 = .152, p = 
.440), as might be predicted if individuals preferred the avatar that matched their gender.  
The differences between Male and Female avatars is noteworthy, as it is possible that 
differences in perspective type may be masked by a Simon effect. Briefly, the Simon effect is the 
robust finding that response times are quicker when a stimulus appears in the same spatial region 
as the response (Simon, 1969). In all our experiments, participants responded “match” with their 
right index finger and “mismatch” with their left index finger. However, as the female avatar 
always appeared on the right side of the screen, it is possible that participants were faster to 
respond when the female avatar saw the correct number of targets.  
 
Controlled Replication 
Twenty Vanderbilt undergraduates (mean age = 18.7, 9 female, 2 left-handed) 
participated for class credit. I ran a replication that counterbalanced avatar location across 
participants to control for potential Simon effects caused by responding with a hand in a different 
spatial location than perspective primed. Participants responded by pressing vertically aligned 
keys centered below the screen with their dominant hand (“correct” with the middle finger and 
“incorrect” with the index finger). This control was implemented for the remainder of this study. 
The procedure and design were otherwise identical to Experiment 1a. Results are illustrated in 
Figure 2.4 
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Figure 2.4. Processing cost in the controlled replication of Experiment 1. Participants were 
significantly delayed in all Inconsistent trial types when responding from their own perspective. 
There were no differences between the avatars’ perspectives (HIS and HERS) within consistency 
type. Error bars denote standard error. 
 
Accuracy 
Critical planned contrasts for Self trials revealed significantly greater accuracy in 
Consistent trials (98.3%) than Self-Other Inconsistent trials (91.3%, t19 = 3.474, p = .001, d = 
.80) or All-Inconsistent Trials (94.9%; t19 = 1.884, p = .038, d = .43), but not greater than Partial-
Inconsistent trials (95.7%, t19 = 1.260, p = .112). Additionally, participants were significantly 
more accurate on Partial Inconsistent trials than Self-Other inconsistent trials (t19 = 1.731, p = 
.049, d = .40). 
A 3 (Perspective) by 4 (Consistency Type) within-subjects ANCOVA revealed no effects 
of handedness (F1,16 =0.033, p = .858) or avatar location (F1,16 = 1.145, p = .300), but did show a 
marginal effect of participant gender (meanfemale = 96.2%, meanmale = 93.8%; F1,16 = 4.018, p = 
.063) and a significant three-way interaction between Perspective, Consistency and Gender 
(F6,108 = 2.926, p = .011). Specifically, males were less accurate on Self perspective S-O Inc 
trials (mean difference = 8.18%, t19 = 2.00, p = .03, d = .46) and Her perspective Partial Inc trials 
(mean difference = 8.26%; t19 = 3.67, p = .002, d = .84). As previous studies have identified no 
differences by gender, and as there are no principled reasons why differences should occur in 
these instances, all subsequent analyses were performed without gender as a covariate. A within-
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subjects ANOVA on participant accuracy revealed significant effects of Perspective (F2,38 = 
4.287, p = .021) and Consistency (F3,57 = 11.781, p < .001), as well as a Perspective*Consistency 
interaction (F6,114 = 3.826, p = .002). Paired comparisons revealed only marginal differences 
between Perspectives across all conditions (highest t19 = 1.530, p’s > .071). Paired comparisons 
by Consistency found significantly greater accuracy in All Consistent trials (98.2%) than Self-
Other Inconsistent (94.5%; t19 = 4.047, p < .001, d = .93), Partial Inconsistent (94.2%; t19 = 
4.448, p < .001, d = 1.02) or All Inconsistent trials (93.7%; t19 = 4.040, p < .001, d = .92). 
Inconsistent trials did not differ from one another (highest t19 = .566, p’s > .711). 
 
Response Times 
Paired comparisons again revealed that participants were slower on Self trials when in the 
presence of any form of inconsistent perspective (lowest t19 = 2.135, all p’s < .023, d’s > .49). 
There were no differences in response times between any of the Self-Inconsistent trials (highest 
t19 = 1.206, p = .88).  
A 3 (Perspective) by 4 (Consistency) mixed effects ANCOVA found no effects of 
participant sex (F1,16 = 2.349, p = .145), handedness (F1,16 = .055, p = .818), or avatar location 
(F1,16 = 1.249, p = .280) on participant response times. A within-subjects ANOVA on participant 
response times revealed significant main effects of Perspective (F3,38 = 42.800, ηp2 = .693, p < 
.001) and Consistency (F3,57 = 18.810, ηp2 = .498, p < .001), but no significant 
Perspective*Consistency interaction (F6,114 = 0.859, p = .547).  
Experiment 1b successfully controlled for differences in response times by avatar. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed no differences in response times to the male or female avatar’s 
perspective (t19 = .843, ns). Across all conditions, participants were significantly faster in Self 
trials (594 ms) than when taking His (672 ms; t19 = 5.951, p < .001, d = 1.37) or Her perspective 
(671 ms; t19 = 7.702, p < .001, d = 1.77). There was no difference between avatar perspectives 
(t19 = 1.231, p =.88, d = 1.77). Participants were significantly faster across all Perspective types 
in Consistent trials (610 ms) than Self-Other Inconsistent (647 ms; t19 = 3.053, p = .003, d = .70), 
Partial Inconsistent (659 ms; t19 = 4.313, p < .001, d = .99) or All Inconsistent trials (670 ms; t19 
= 5.053, p < .001, d = 1.16). Overall response times for Self-Other Inconsistent trials were faster 
than All Inconsistent trials (t19 = 3.310, p = .003, d = .69). There were no other differences 
between Inconsistent trial types (highest t19 = 1.177, p > .126). 
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The critical findings of Experiment 1a were replicated. Participants in Self Perspective 
All Consistent trials were significantly faster and less error prone than in Self-Other Inconsistent 
or All Inconsistent trials, and significantly faster than Partial Inconsistent trials.  
 
Discussion 
Experiments 1a and 1b demonstrated that individuals show a categorical increase in 
processing costs when in the presence of any inconsistent perspective, and aside from a small 
difference in accuracy between Partial-Inconsistent and Self-Other Inconsistent trials in 
Experiment 1b, revealed no differences between types of inconsistency. These processing costs 
appeared even when controlling for avatar placement, gender, handedness and Simon effect 
confounds.  
This evidence suggests that the default perspective-taking system does not necessarily 
represent all perspectives in a scene, but may rather signal that any other perspective differs from 
one’s own. In other words, the default system may be a heuristic signal of privileged knowledge. 
This tentatively supports an egocentric deviation hypothesis, in which the default perspective-
taking system responds whether a perspective deviates from one’s own perspective, but is not 
sophisticated enough to differentiate between multiple diverging perspectives.  
However, it is also possible that the early system of perspective taking does respond to 
increasing magnitudes of differing perspectives but that the design of Experiment 1 was 
insufficient in capturing this nuance. It may be the case that the early system responds to social 
convergence or divergence only when it is necessary to attend to differences in groups of 
perspectives. For this reason, Experiment 2 tested whether multiple differing perspectives 
influenced perspective taking when participants were required to attend to groups, not 
individuals. 
 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 found that the presence of any perspective different from one’s own 
elicited errors and response delays. Additional conflicting perspectives, which at times aligned 
with or against one’s personal perspective, appeared to have no impact on response times, and 
largely did not alter error rates. Experiment 2 tested the additional possibility that the early 
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system of perspective taking may be more sensitive to agreement or conflict between multiple 
other perspectives if the task demanded attention to whole groups of agents. 
 Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 with one critical difference. Instead of responding 
to the individual perspectives of Self, Him and Her, participants reported their own perspective 
or the perspective of one or both avatars. In Either trials, participants responded whether either 
one of the avatars could see the cued number of targets in a display. In Both trials, participants 
responded whether both of the avatars saw the exact number of cued targets in the display. If the 
early system is sensitive to the magnitude of conflicting perspectives when all perspectives are 
task relevant, then we expect response delays in Self trials that were not seen in Experiment 1. If 
delays do not differ between inconsistent trials, then it is likely that the early system of 
perspective taking does not individualize alternative perspectives, regardless of task demands. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 Thirty-five Vanderbilt undergraduate students participated for class credit. Twelve 
participants were excluded for chance performance on all Self trials, indicating a 
misunderstanding of instructions in this more complicated design. These participants responded 
in a manner suggesting they interpreted the number cue to mean “at least X objects” rather than 
“exactly X objects.” This left 23 subjects for analysis (mean age = 18.9, 17 female, 18 right-
handed).  
 
Stimuli & Procedure 
 The stimuli and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 1b, save for a 
critical change in the Perspective cues. The Perspective cues in Experiment 1 prompted 
participants towards their own or either the male or female avatar’s individual perspectives. 
Perspective cues in Experiment 2 instead directed participants to report what Both avatars could 
see in a display or what Either avatar could see, in addition to their own (Self) perspective. The 
timing of trials remained identical to Experiment 1: participants viewed a Perspective cue, 
followed by a number cue and a display, and participants responded whether exactly the number 
of objects cued could be seen by the perspective cued. For example, participants given a “Both” 
		 44	
cue followed by a “1” and then saw the display in Figure 2.2b, they would give a “yes” response, 
but they would not if they saw Figure 2.2c, as both avatars do not see exactly one target. 
However, participants given an “Either” cue would respond affirmatively to Figure 2.2c if they 
saw either a “1” or a “3” as at least one of the avatars can see one or three objects. Trial 
conditions were counterbalanced and completely randomized over six blocks. Avatar location 
was randomly assigned to each participant, with 12 seeing the female avatar on the left and male 
avatar on the right, and 11 seeing the reverse. 
 
Figure 2.5. Processing costs in Experiment 2. Participants were significantly delayed on Self 
trials when any combination of perspectives differed from their own. Error bars denote standard 
error of the mean. 
 
Results  
 
Accuracy 
Looking specifically at Self-perspective trials, paired comparisons revealed that 
Consistent trials (98.2%) were significantly more accurate than Self-Other Inconsistent (93.2%; 
t22 = 3.263, p =.002, d > .681), All Inconsistent (94.6%) and Partial Inconsistent (95.3%) trials 
(all t22 > 1.95, p < .034, d > .473). There were no differences between types of inconsistency (all 
t22 < .525, p < .303).  
Overall accuracy data is illustrated in Figure 2.5a. A 3 (Perspective) by 4 (Consistency) 
mixed effects ANCOVA found no effects of avatar location (F1,19 = 1.461, p = .242), participant 
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gender (F1,19 = 0.064, p = .802) or handedness (F1,19 = 1.863, p = .188). A within-subjects 
ANOVA revealed significant effects of Perspective (F2,44 = 6.696, p = .003, ηp2 = .233) and 
Consistency (F3,66 = 12.190, p <.001, ηp2 = .356), and a Perspective*Consistency interaction 
(F6,132 = 3.961, p = .001, ηp2 = .153). Paired comparisons by Perspective indicated that 
participants were significantly less accurate on Either trials (93.1%) than Self (95.2%; t22 = 
2.131, p = .044, d = .45) or Both trials (96.1%; t22 =4.174, p < .001, d = .89), but there was no 
difference between Self and Either trials (t22 =1.264, p = .220). Similar analyses by Consistency 
revealed that participants were significantly more accurate in Consistent trials (97.2%) than Self-
Other Inconsistent (94.3%; t22 = 4.813, p < .001, d = 1.03), Partial Inconsistent (94.6 %, t22 = 
3.859, p < .001, d = .82) and All Inconsistent trials (93.4%; t22 = 5.477, p < .001, d = 1.17). 
There were no differences in accuracy between Inconsistent types (lowest t22 = 1.712, p > .101) 
 
Response Times 
Analysis of critical Self trials revealed that Consistent trials (651 ms) were significantly 
faster than Self-Other Inconsistent (708 ms; t22 = 4.384, p = .001, d =1.06), Partial Inconsistent 
(708 ms; t22 = 2.756, p = .007, d =.668) and All Inconsistent trials (706 ms; t22 = 2.478, p = .012, 
d =.601). There were no differences between Inconsistent trial types (highest t22 = 1.539, p > 
.929). 
Overall response time data is visualized in Figure 2.5b. A 3 (Perspective) by 4 
(Consistency) mixed effects ANCOVA found no effects of avatar location (F1,19 = 2.822, p = 
.109), participant gender (F1,19 = 0.242, p = .629) or handedness (F1,19 = 1.210, p = .285). A 
within-subjects ANOVA revealed main effects of Perspective (F2,44 = 185.713, ηp2 = .894, p < 
.001) and Consistency (F3,66 = 82.794, ηp2 = .790, p < .001), as well as a significant 
Perspective*Consistency interaction (F6,132 = 14.272, ηp2 = .393, p < .001). Paired comparisons 
by Perspective revealed that Self trials (689 ms) were significantly faster than Either trials (887 
ms; t22 = 15.018, p < .001, d = 3.13) and Both trials (834 ms; t22 = 15.191, p < .001, d = 3.17). 
Both trials were also significantly faster than Either trials (t22 = 6.169, p < .001, d = 1.29). Paired 
comparisons between Consistency types revealed that Consistent trials (717 ms) were 
significantly faster than Self-Other Inconsistent (784 ms; t22 = 8.186, p < .001, d = 1.75), Parial 
Inconsistent (845 ms; t22 = 12.365, p < .001, d = 2.64), or All Inconsistent trials (847 ms; t22 = 
9.805, p < .001, d = 2.09). Every Inconsistent type differed from every other Inconsistent type 
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(lowest t22 = 6.771, p < .001, d > 1.44), with the exception of All Inconsistent and Partial 
Inconsistent trials (mean difference = 1.6 ms; t22 = 0.207, p = .838).  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 tested whether attending to groups of agents altered processing costs 
associated with multiple inconsistent perspectives. Results replicated those found in Experiment 
1: participants incurred processing costs when any perspective differed from their own, 
regardless of the number or overlap of differing perspectives. These results support the 
egocentric deviation hypothesis. The early system appears to calculate the presence of differing 
perspectives, but is not sensitive to the magnitude or contents of those perspectives. This 
suggests that the early system is not sensitive to magnitudes of differing perspectives. These 
experiments therefore provide evidence against the assertion that individuals automatically 
represent other’s perspectives in their entirety (as with Leslie, Friedman & German, 2004) or 
selectively guides attention to the content’s of another’s perspective (Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009). Rather, individuals may merely be sensitive to scenes where their own knowledge may be 
privileged. 
One possible mechanism for the early system of perspective taking is that it exogenously 
cues attention to the contents of another’s visuospatial perspective. Experiments 1-2 may 
demonstrate the limits of such an attentional mechanism, in that it stops once a single differing 
perspective is detected. However, if attention is captured by differences in perspectives, then the 
presence of an inconsistent perspective should induce cognitive costs even if the difference in 
perspectives is irrelevant to one’s current task. Experiment 3 tests whether the cognitive costs 
associated with default perspective-taking appear only when perspectives differ to a relevant 
attentional set. 
 
Experiment 3  
One potential mechanism for the early system of perspective-taking might be to 
selectively guide attention to objects or regions where another agent cannot see. Perspective 
taking would thus constitute a rapid, broad gist similar to the perception of scene categories 
(Greene & Oliva, 2009). However, this seems highly unlikely given the sheer number of objects 
that another agent may or may not have access to in a real world scene. Take the example of a 
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party. You see a friend go towards a table with several cans of soda, some hidden behind a punch 
bowl. Does the early perspective-taking system account for this incongruence if your friend has 
expressly asked for a slice of pizza, and he is to your knowledge indifferent towards a beverage? 
Moreover, what if the table is laden with miscellaneous snacks, with multiple objects partially or 
fully occluded from your friend’s gaze? We can see that even a relatively mundane occurrence 
asks a great deal of an early-attentive perspective-taking system.  
Whereas Experiments 1 and 2 tested the sensitivity of default system perspective-taking 
to multiple agents, Experiment 3 tested the default system’s selection among multiple competing 
perspectives of a single agent. This experiment thus addressed two potential limitations of 
default perspective-taking. First, it tested whether the early system differentiates between two 
perspectives from the same agent. Second, it tested whether default perspective calculation is 
limited to the immediate attended set of features.  
 
Figure 2.6. Multiple-set stimuli in Experiments 3a and 3b. Sets ranged from 0-3 items present in 
two sets (blue spheres or green cones), and wall segments moved independently to occlude 0-3 
items from each set from the avatar’s perspective. Note that the only difference between Set 
Consistent and Set Inconsistent trials is the set cued. Stimuli in Experiment 3b were identical 
save that blue or green sets were mixed between levels. 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 Twenty-five Vanderbilt University undergraduates participated for class credit. One participant 
was excluded for performing more than three standard deviations below the mean in accuracy, leaving a 
total of 24 participants (mean age = 19.0, 17 Female, all right-handed).  
 
Stimuli & Procedure 
The design of displays was similar to Experiment 1 of Baker, Levin & Saylor (2015). 
Each display contained two sets of targets: a set of zero to three blue spheres and a set of zero to 
three green cones aligned horizontally (Figure 2.6). A thin wall centered at the avatar’s eye 
height divided the objects into two rows. Each set of objects was potentially divided by a vertical 
wall in one of four locations on a horizontal axis. Cones appeared on the top row and spheres 
appeared on the bottom row. As with previous experiments, participants saw a perspective cue 
(YOU or HIM/HER) followed by a number cue (0-3). However, in this experiment the number 
cue was colored either blue or green. Participants responded whether the perspective primed 
could see the exact number of cued objects in the matching color set.  
This design yielded four conditions (Figure 2.6). In All Consistent trials, participants and 
avatars saw the same number of both sets of objects. In All Inconsistent trials, participants and 
avatars saw different numbers of both blue spheres and green cones. In Set Consistent trials, 
participants and avatars saw the same numbers of targets but different numbers of distracters. 
Conversely, participants and avatars saw the same numbers of distracters but different numbers 
of targets in Set Inconsistent trials. If the early system activates after attentional selection, then 
processing costs should be reduced or absent in Set Inconsistent trials. However, if the default 
system guides attention objects outside of one’s attentional set, then participants should 
demonstrate processing costs for both Set Consistent and Distracter Inconsistent trials. 
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Figure 2.7. Processing costs in Experiment 3. Participants incurred processing costs on Self 
trials when another’s perspective of an attended set differed from their own perspective. 
However, participants were unaffected by inconsistent perspectives of the unattended sets.. 
 
Results 
 
Accuracy 
 
Looking at critical Self-perspective trials, paired comparisons revealed that All 
Consistent trials (96.7%) were significantly more accurate than All Inconsistent trials (91.9%; t23 
= 4.237, p < .001, d = .88) and Set Inconsistent trials (92.6%; t23 = 3.893, p < .001, d = .81). In 
agreement with a top-down control hypothesis, participants did not differ in their accuracy 
between All Consistent and Set Consistent trials (97.1%; t23 = 0.029, p =.511). Likewise, 
participants were significantly more accurate in Set Consistent trials than All Inconsistent (t23 = 
4.695, p < .001, d = .98) and Set Inconsistent trials (t23 = 4.278, p < .001, d = .89). All 
Inconsistent trials did not differ from Set Inconsistent trials (t23 = 0.028, p = .511). 
Overall accuracy data is illustrated in Figure 2.7a. A 2 (Perspective) by 4 (Consistency) 
within-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Consistency (F3,69 = 32.311, p <.001, 
ηp2 = .584) and a Perspective*Consistency interaction (F3,69 = 3.015, p =.035, ηp2 = .116), but no 
main effect of Perspective (F1,23 = 1.461, p = .239). Paired comparisons by Consistency indicate 
that participants were significantly more accurate on All Consistent trials (97.5%) than All 
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Inconsistent (91.9%, t24 = 6.679, p < .001, d = 1.39) and Set Inconsistent trials (91.2%, t24 = 
5.385, p < .001, d = 1.12), but were not significantly different from Set Consistent trials (96.7%; 
t24 = 0.345, p = .37). All Inconsistent trials also did not differ from Set Inconsistent trials (t24 = 
.259, p = .400).  
 
Response Times 
Analysis of critical Self trials revealed that Consistent trials (650 ms) were significantly 
faster than All Inconsistent (692 ms; t23 = 2.368, p = .013, d =.49) and Set Inconsistent trials (694 
ms; t23 = 2.355, p = .014, d =.491), but did not differ from Set Consistent trials (660 ms; t23 = 
.286, p = .611). Set Consistent trials significantly differed from both All Inconsistent (t23 = 3.973, 
p = .002, d = .83) and Set Inconsistent Trials (t23 = 3.244, p < .002, d = .68). Inconsistent trials 
were not significantly different (t23 = 1.192, p = .123). 
Overall response time data is visualized in Figure 2.7b. A 2 (Perspective) by 4 
(Consistency) within-subjects ANOVA revealed main effects of Perspective (F1,23 = 89.322, ηp2 
= .989, p < .001) and Consistency (F3,48 = 38.400, ηp2 = .975, p < .001), as well as a significant 
Perspective*Consistency interaction (F6,96 = 4.813, ηp2 = .173, p = .004). Paired comparisons by 
Perspective revealed that Self trials (673 ms) were significantly faster than Other trials (756 ms; 
t23 = 9.503, p < .001, d = 1.98). Across both perspectives, paired comparisons between 
consistency types revealed that All Consistent trials (675 ms) were significantly faster than All 
Inconsistent (741 ms; t23 = 6.868, p < .001, d = 1.43) and Set Inconsistent trials (747 ms; t23 = 
6.658, p < .001, d = 1.39). All Consistent trials were also significantly faster than Set Consistent 
trials (698 ms; t23 = 2.285, p = .016, d = 0.48). Set Consistent trials were faster than both All 
Inconsistent (t23 = 6.658, p < .001, d = 1.39) and Set Inconsistent trials (t23 = 6.224, p < .001, d = 
1.30). Inconsistent trials did not significantly differ (t23 = 0.367, p = .358). 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 demonstrated that behaviors associated with default perspective-taking 
only emerge after attentional selection. Participants only incurred processing costs when an 
actively attended subset of objects were seen differently by another agent. This runs counter to a 
mechanism that guides attention to regions of conflicting perspectives. Rather, it appears that the 
perspective-taking module only activates after selection of a set of objects. This is consistent 
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with a heuristic decision-making mechanism, by which the early system signals that one’s 
perspective of an attended set is privileged. This scenario points to early-system perspective-
taking as more of a decision making heuristic than a perceptual module. 
 However, Experiment 3 contained a potential confound that may have facilitated 
subsetting. Sets of green cones always appeared in the upper row, while sets of blue spheres 
always appeared in the lower row. The predictable and non-overlapping locations of each set 
may have reduced effort required for search and minimized potential perspective-taking effects 
in the unattended channel. I therefore ran a control study that replicated the exact stimuli and 
procedure used in Experiment 3, with the critical difference that green and blue sets were 
randomly presented in either the top or bottom rows (Figure 2.6). If default perspective taking 
behavior only emerges after selection of a set, and therefore ignores perspective differences in 
the unattended set, then participants should similarly show no processing costs in the Set 
Consistent trials with these new stimuli. 
 
Controlled Replication 
 Twenty-five Vanderbilt undergraduates participated for class credit. One participant was 
dropped for performing over three standard deviations below the mean in accuracy, leaving 24 
participants for analysis (mean age = 19.5, 18 female, 21 left-handed). The stimuli and procedure 
of this replication experiment were identical to the previous experiment, with the notable 
exception that target cones and spheres could potentially appear in both the top and bottom rows 
of the display. Positions of targets and distractors were randomized, though importantly these 
new stimuli otherwise mirrored the stimuli from Experiment 3a. For instance, if an All 
Inconsistent display from Experiment 3a showed three cones and two spheres, and the avatar 
could only three one cone and one sphere, the same was true of the complementary display in 
Experiment 3b with the exception that targets were mixed between rows. Overall accuracy and 
response time data are illustrated in Figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.8. Processing cost in the controlled replication of Experiment 3. Participants were 
significantly delayed in all Inconsistent trial types when responding from their own perspective. 
There were no differences between the avatars’ perspectives (HIS and HERS) within consistency 
type. Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
 
Accuracy 
Critical planned contrasts for Self trials revealed significantly greater accuracy in 
Consistent trials (97.8%) than All Inconsistent (93.1%, t23 = 4.125, p = .001, d = .86) and Set 
Inconsistent trials (93.4%, t23 = 4.230, p = .001, d = .86), but did not differ from Set Consistent 
trials (97.2%, t23 = 0.782, p = .221). Likewise, Set Consistent trials significantly differed from 
All Inconsistent (t23 = 3.820, p < .001, d = .80) and Set Inconsistent Trials (t23 = 3.819, p < .001, 
d = .79). All Inconsistent trials did not differ from Set Inconsistent trials (t23 = 0.417, p = .660). 
A 2 (Perspective) by 4 (Consistency) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of Perspective (F3,69 = 22.824, p <.001, ηp2 = .498), Consistency (F3,69 = 28.723, p <.001, 
ηp2 = .555) and a Perspective*Consistency interaction (F3,69 = 4.482, p =.006, ηp2 = .163). 
Participants were significantly more accurate across consistency trial types in Self trials (95.3%) 
than Other trials (91.7%; t23 = 4.786, p <.001, d = 1.00). Paired comparisons by Consistency 
indicate that participants were significantly more accurate on All Consistent trials (97.6%) than 
All Inconsistent (91.1%, t23 = 6.305, p < .001, d = 1.31), Set Inconsistent (90.6%, t23 = 6.312, p < 
.001, d = 1.32), and also Set Consistent trials (95.4%; t23 = 3.851, p <.001, d = .80). However, 
Set Consistent trials were significantly more accurate than both All Inconsistent (t23 = 3.719, p < 
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.001, d = .78) and Set Inconsistent trials (t23 = 3.851, p < .001, d = 0.80). All Inconsistent trials 
did not differ from Set Inconsistent trials (t24 = .155, p = .439).  
 
Response Times 
Analysis of critical Self trials revealed that Consistent trials (615 ms) were significantly 
faster than All Inconsistent (666 ms; t23 = 3.854, p < .001, d =.80) and Set Inconsistent trials (648 
ms; t23 = 3.13, p = .002, d =.65), but did not differ from Set Consistent trials (618 ms; t23 = .425, 
p = .663). Set Consistent trials significantly differed from both All Inconsistent (t23 = 3.973, p = 
.002, d = .83) and Set Inconsistent Trials (t23 = 4.162, p < .001, d = .87). Inconsistent trials were 
significantly different (t23 = 1.822, p = .041, d = .37).  
A 2 (Perspective) by 4 (Consistency) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of Perspective (F3,69 = 131.640, p <.001, ηp2 = .851), Consistency (F3,69 = 44.953, p <.001, 
ηp2 = .662) and a Perspective*Consistency interaction (F3,69 = 3.209, p =.028, ηp2 = .122). Paired 
comparisons by Perspective across consistency trial types found that participants were 
significantly faster in Self trials (638 ms) than Other trials (749 ms; t23 = 11.503; p < .001; d = 
2.40). Paired comparisons by Consistency indicate that participants were significantly faster on 
All Consistent trials (659 ms) than All Inconsistent (720ms; t23 = 8.629, p < .001, d = 1.80), Set 
Inconsistent (712 ms; t23 = 7.953, p < .001, d = 1.66), and Set Consistent trials (676 t23 = 2.051, p 
=.026, d = .43). However, Set Consistent trials were significantly faster than both All 
Inconsistent (t23 = 6.100, p < .001, d = 1.27) and Set Inconsistent trials (t23 = 5.625, p < .001, d = 
1.17). All Inconsistent trials did not differ from Set Inconsistent trials (t24 = 1.163, p = .128).  
The critical findings of Experiment 3a were replicated. Participants were slower and 
more error prone when identifying targets of an attended set that could not be seen by another 
agent, even when the locations of these objects were unpredictable and mixed with distractor 
objects. If, as some suggest, the early system of perspective taking directs attention to the 
contents of another’s visuospatial access, then participants should have incurred processing costs 
when an agent held an inconsistent perspective of any set of objects. This was not the case across 
two experiments. These results suggest that the hypothesized default system of perspective-
taking does not direct attention to the contents of another’s perspective. Rather, it appears that 
participants incur costs only after attentional selection. These results are consistent with a 
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heuristic at the level of decision-making, where individuals rapidly calculate whether their own 
perspective is privileged after attentional selection. 
 
General Discussion 
A robust body of work since Piaget and Inhelder (1956) has suggested that perspective 
taking is cognitively effortful. Participants demonstrate egocentric interference as they set aside 
their own view of a scene to interpret what another person may see (i.e., Keysar, Lin, Barr, 2003; 
Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004). Samson and colleagues challenged this notion with the 
introduction of the dot-perspective task, where participants viewing scenes where another agent 
held a different perspective incurred “altercentric interference”, presumably demonstrating that 
viewers represent another’s perspective by default. Recently, we demonstrated that the dot-
perspective task was robust to low-level confounds such as spatial attentional cuing or perceptual 
grouping, validating the finding that perceiving a conflicting perspective leads to processing 
costs (Baker, Levin & Saylor, 2016). However, it remained uncertain exactly what these costs 
meant for scene perception, attention and representation. 
This study found evidence that viewer’s calculations of other’s perspectives are quite 
limited. Viewers did not incur increasing processing costs as the number of alternative 
perspectives increased, as would be the case if they actively represented each divergent 
perspective. Viewers also did not incur processing costs for objects outside of one’s top-down 
attentional set, indicating that the early system is relegated to items within an attentional set. The 
absence of processing costs when another’s perspective of ignored sets differs from one’s own 
further suggests that if the early system guides attention, it does so after initial selection of items. 
The culmination of these effects leads to a much more limited conceptualization of the early 
system than previously discussed. Rather than drawing attention to perspectives and scaffolding 
representation to those perspectives, the early system appears to constitute a heuristic signal that 
one has privileged access to a scene. This egocentric deviation signal only occurs after 
attentional selection and is indifferent to the magnitude of the difference between perspectives. 
These results are consistent with an early-developing decision making heuristic that identifies 
whether attended objects are separated in space from any other agent. 
Investigation of the early system to this point has largely concerned its existence: whether 
the effects ascribed to the phenomenon could be due to confounding variables, and whether the 
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effects constitute domain-specific processing. This study takes a different tactic by tentatively 
accepting the existence of the early system and then testing its limitations. Many experiments 
demonstrating this phenomenon are ingeniously designed precisely to test the existence of this 
phenomenon, but lack specificity to state how the proposed system functions. Debates 
concerning the nature of default perspective-taking will be better informed by investigation on 
the specific circumstances by which other perspectives automatically influence behavior. Given 
the current findings, the early system appears to influence decision-making relatively late in the 
perceptual cycle. Future research should further investigate how the presence of other 
perspectives affects perception, attention, representation and decision-making before making 
conclusions on the nature and function of the proposed early system of perspective taking. 
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Chapter 3 
 
SOCIAL AGENTS BIAS VISUAL SEARCH TO REGIONS OF PRIVLEDGED ACCESS 
 
Abstract 
 Several recent theories of mental state reasoning suggest that human beings have an 
early-developing mechanism that directs attention to another agent’s beliefs and visual-spatial 
perspectives. Supporting experiments found that individuals were slower and more error prone in 
decision making tasks when an agent in a scene sees or knows something differently than the 
viewer. However, it is unknown how the presence of social agents directs visual attention, if at 
all. Here, I test the effect of social agents on visual search. Participants responded whether they 
or a cartoon agent with unrestricted or limited visual access to a scene could see a target among a 
number of distracters. Consistent with theories of rapid perspective-taking, results suggest that 
participants altered their behavior in response to the agent’s perspective. Somewhat surprisingly, 
search slopes and intercepts were unaffected by conflict between perspectives, suggesting that 
other perspectives do not tax visual attention. However, search slopes increased as a function of 
target distance from the agent, suggesting that individuals preferentially searched locations the 
avatar could not see. These results raise the provocative possibility that a rapid system of 
perspective-taking biases search to regions of privileged access. 
 
Introduction 
Perspective-taking is ubiquitous in human interaction. Navigating social situations 
requires prediction of the likely behaviors of other agents, their common and privileged 
knowledge, and one’s ability to share this knowledge. Driving through a four-way stop, for 
instance, requires a number of perspective judgments. Does the other driver see the stop sign? 
Do they see me? Will they see the sign but nonetheless break the law? In the previous chapter, I 
explored claims about representation and attention in behaviors associated with taking another’s 
perspective by default. That study supported the claim that individuals are sensitive to the 
presence of a differing perspective within limits: participants do not discriminate multiple 
perspectives, nor perspectives outside of the participant’s attentional set. These results add to a 
burgeoning literature suggesting a degree of automaticity to perspective taking. However, it is 
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still unknown how the underlying perspective-taking system functions. One frequent proposal is 
that social agents guide attention to regions of shared perceptual access. However, it could also 
be the case that delays associated with automatic perspective-taking are not due to attentional 
capture, but rather a heuristic decision-making process that delays responding after attentional 
selection. This study used a visual search paradigm to test how the presence of another social 
agent guides attention. 
 
Arguments for a Domain-Specific Mechanism of Perspective-Taking 
Despite its importance in everyday human life, perspective-taking is fraught with errors. 
Individuals often assume others share their knowledge (known as egocentrism, Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1956; Flavell, Everett, Croft & Flavell, 1981), and fail at perspective-taking tasks when 
under time constraints (Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004), cognitive load (Lin, Keysar & 
Epley, 2010) or when they simply lack motivation (Klein & Hodges, 2001). And yet the fact 
remains that a tacit level of perspective understanding permeates the most basic of social 
interactions. People engaged in conversation adopt pronouns that implicitly acknowledge shared 
knowledge (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Garrod & Pickering, 2009); adults and children anticipate 
the goals of an action (Baldwin, Anderson, Saffran & Meyer, 2008; Zacks, Kumar, Abrams & 
Mehta, 2009), so much so that they often infer seeing goals in their absence (Strickland & Keil, 
2011); and infants as young as five months look longer at displays that are contrary to an agent’s 
beliefs, even when the displays are consistent with the infant’s knowledge (Kovacs, Teglas & 
Endress, 2010). Most recently, adult research has demonstrated that the presence of another’s 
inconsistent perspective causes participants to be slower and more error prone when giving their 
own perspective (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodely Scott, 2011), even when 
controlling for spatial cuing and perceptual grouping effects (Baker, Levin & Saylor, 2016). Why 
can individuals sometimes calculate other’s knowledge with relative ease, only to show 
remarkable deficits in mental state reasoning in other tasks? 
Several psychologists have proposed theories of perspective taking that merge 
cognitively effortful, error prone perspective-taking with the seemingly automatic perspective-
taking suggested by developmental research (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Gergely & Csibra, 
2003; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Leslie, Friedman & German, 2005; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Tomasello et al, 2005; Aperly & Butterfill, 2009; Samson et al, 2010; among others). To some 
		 58	
degree, all models suggest that an early-developing and potentially modular system facilitates the 
automatic, limited computation of another’s mental state, while a later-developing system 
elaborates upon those computations. Models diverge in precisely how this early system 
functions. Some argue that early system guides selective attention to locations of shared 
perceptual access (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Samson, Apperly, 
Braithwait, Andrews & Bodely-Scott, 2011). Others suggest that the early system facilitates 
limited representation of other perspectives (Leslie, Friedman & German, 2004) or otherwise 
motivates implicit reasoning about another’s knowledge (Bargh & Fergusson, 2004; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005), and that this knowledge influences judgments and attitudes. Still others 
contend that the default system attributes mental states to agents and actions, presumably leading 
to interference when mental states differ (Castelli, Happe, Frith & Frith, 2000; Fergusson & 
Bargh, 2004; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Tomasello et al, 2005; Kovacs, Teglas & Endress, 2010). 
Importantly, none of these theories deny the role of executive control in overt perspective-taking 
judgments. However, despite that many if not all of these theories allude to attentional guidance 
by social agents, no study to date has measured whether the presence of social agents influences 
deployment of attention. By incorporating the designs of perspective-taking studies with a classic 
test of visual attention, we can begin to investigate claims of rapid guidance of attention by 
social stimuli. 
 
Visual Search and Perspective Taking 
 Visual search is one of the most prevalent human behaviors. Our eyes constantly scan for 
objects and features in our environment, either through top-down control (e.g., looking for one’s 
car keys) or through bottom-up salience (e.g., stark contrasts in motion, color or luminance; 
Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Wolfe, 1994). Due to the simplicity of 
the behavior and the high level of laboratory control permitted, the psychophysical study of 
visual search has become one of the most prevalent and reliable paradigms for studying visual 
attention. In general, participants in visual search paradigms respond whether a target is present 
among different numbers of distracters. Researchers derive two measures from participant 
response times over large numbers of trials. The slope, the increasing mean response time as a 
function of set size, indicates the time required to attend to each item in a display before 
terminating search. If slope approaches zero, the search may be considered efficient, meaning 
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that detection of the stimuli is likely bottom-up and potentially pre-attentive (e.g., searching for a 
red square in a field of blue squares). Search slopes in excess of 15 ms are generally referred to 
as inefficient (Triesman & Gelade, 1980; Triesman & Gormican, 1988; Wolfe, 1994), meaning 
that participants must serially attend to individual items, features or groups of features. A second 
common measure is the response time intercept, the projected response time if set size were to 
equal zero. Differences in intercept are often attributable to task components outside of 
sequential deployments of attention, including cognitive, motor and decision-making 
components that accompany the search (e.g., searching for an object and then responding in the 
direction of its orientation; Wolfe, 1994). 
 Search slopes and intercepts reveal how bottom-up and top-down attention interact in 
scene perception. Evidence supports that a variety of efficient processes operate over large 
portions of the visual field to rapidly guide attention to unique shapes, colors, orientations or 
movements regardless of the number of items in the scene (Nakayama & Silverman, 1985; 
Theeuwes & Kooi, 1994). Attentional capture of efficient processes (e.g., onset of a bright or 
moving stimulus; Theeuwes, 2004; Fockert, Rees, Frith & Lavie, 2004) often increase search 
intercepts without altering slopes, suggesting that attention is briefly captured by the surprising 
stimulus before returning to the scene as a whole. Conversely, inefficient attentional processing 
requires individuals to dwell on individual items or groups of items, devote limited capacity 
resources to accept or reject each item as a target and then move to another location (Egeth & 
Yantis, 1997; Zelisnky & Sheinberg, 1997). Inefficient processing is typically identified by 
increased search slopes, as the identification of targets or processing of items in clusters is 
disrupted (Logan, 1996). This might occur as stimulus salience depreciates (Duncan & 
Humphreys, 1989) or as the number of conjunctive diagnostic criteria for target acceptance 
increases (Nakayama & Silverman, 1985). Notably, most theorists agree that efficient and 
inefficient processes cooperatively guide attention in visual search (Wolfe, 1994). An early 
system of perspective taking could therefore reasonably influence attention at multiple levels.  
Researchers have demonstrated that higher-order cognition can impact inefficient 
processes as demonstrated by search slopes. Early work revealed that low-level differences in 
object category could facilitate efficient visual search (e.g., a left-leaning target among mixed 
right-leaning distracters; Wolfe et al, 1992). At a higher level, visually complex and abstract 
semantic object categories can also guide visual search, such as efficient search for animal 
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targets among inanimate distractors (Levin, Takarae, Miner & Keil, 2001). Furthermore, 
individuals demonstrate more efficient slopes for items in categorically consistent locations (e.g., 
a blimp in the sky vs. on the ground (Neider & Zelinsky, 2006). Although knowledge-driven 
search is less efficient than perceptually-driven search (Yang & Zelinsky, 2009), knowledge 
influences deployment of visual attention to categorical targets far faster than chance alone 
would predict. Knowledge about mental states may direct visual search in the same manner. 
Although no research has explicitly explored visual search during perspective taking, 
several studies have touched upon the influence of social cognition on search behaviors. Brennan 
et al. (2008) had pairs of participants search a display by coordinating verbally or by seeing each 
other’s gaze overlaid on the display. Availability of another’s gaze overlaid on a display not only 
improved search above solo trials, but was more efficient than search with speech alone, or gaze 
and speech combined (Neider et al, 2010). These cooperative search paradigms illustrated that 
overt knowledge of another perspective can alter visual search strategies. It is therefore possible 
that implicit mental state knowledge could influence visual search as well. 
 
The Current Study 
 Various researchers have claimed that a default system of perspective-taking facilitates 
preferential attention to the targets of shared visual access. However, no experiment has 
explicitly tested the effect of social agents on attentional selection. In two experiments, I 
compared visual search behavior during perspective taking, measuring whether visuospatial 
access of another agent in a scene altered search behavior. It is important to point out that the 
design and implications of these experiments fundamentally differ from previous perspective-
taking designs, including those described in Chapter 2. Nearly every demonstration of implicit 
perspective-taking behavior in adults and children has limited the number of perspectives and 
potential targets to a very small number within the range of subitization (McCleery et al, 2011; 
Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 2010; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Scott, 2010; 
Samson & Apperly, 2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Baker, Levin & Saylor, 2016). These 
designs tested whether the presence of a differing perspective led to cognitive load, presumably 
through conflicting representations of the agent’s perspective and one’s own perspective. In 
contrast, the design of the current study tested whether the presence of a differing perspective 
altered the deployment of attention throughout a scene.  
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Social agents could theoretically guide attention in a number of ways. Theories 
suggesting an automatic calculation of shared visual access with another agent (e.g., Samson et 
al, 2011) might predict an efficient process that calculates an agent’s visual access over large 
portions of the visual field at one time. Such global perspective-taking would elicit an overall 
processing cost in search intercepts when searching a visual scene containing a difference in 
perspectives. Second, viewers may represent each searched item from the other agent’s 
perspective (as with Leslie, Friedman & German, 2004), eliciting a small but steady cost for 
every item searched. This serial perspective-taking would increase the time needed to attend to 
each item in a scene containing divergent perspectives, increasing search slopes. Third, 
participants may change their search strategies in response to the agent, preferentially initiating 
search to regions accessible by the agent. Participants with search initiation bias would scan 
items near to the avatar first, leading to faster search slopes when the target appears near to the 
avatar and slower search slopes when targets are far from the avatar. Lastly, participants might 
demonstrate response inhibition if they detect a target and then calculate another’s perspective 
before making a response about the target. This would involve slower search intercepts only for 
those targets that cannot be scene by the avatar.  
 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 tested whether the presence of another perspective influences visual search. 
Experiment 1 combined the perspective-taking task used by Samson, Apperly Braithwaite, 
Andrews and Bodley Scott (2011) with a visual search paradigm. Participants searched for a 
target among similar distractors. On half of trials, participants additionally reported whether an 
avatar in the scene could see the target, which was occluded from the avatar’s line of sight on 
half of trials. This study is principally interested in trials where the participant took their own 
perspective, as these trials would reveal behavioral differences even when it was beneficial to 
ignore the avatar. The perspective-taking system might guide visual search in four independent 
ways. If perspective-taking occurs by capturing attention before search we would expect global 
perspective taking, as measured by increased intercepts when scenes contain differing 
perspectives. If perspective-taking requires increased attention to serially process each item in 
the display we would expect serial perspective-taking costs, illustrated by steeper slopes during 
when perspectives differ. If perspective taking occurs by capturing attention at the initiation of 
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search we would expect search bias, demonstrated by faster slopes when targets are near the 
avatar. Finally, if perspective-taking occurs after search termination during response formulation 
we would expect response inhibition, characterized by increased intercepts only on those trials 
were the target cannot be seen by the avatar. Any combination of these hypotheses would 
indicate a change in search behavior evoked by the presence of another agent. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 Sample sizes were based upon data from a previous experiment integrating visual search 
and a secondary task (Woodman, Vogel & Luck 2001). In that study, an ANOVA testing search 
intercepts by increasing working memory load revealed an estimated effect size ηp2 of .466 for a 
sample size of 10. With the assumption of an effect roughly half that size (ηp2 = .233), power 
analyses suggested that twelve participants were necessary to find significant differences in 
search slope with 95% power. A total of 14 Vanderbilt University students (11 female, 12 right-
handed, median age = 19) participated for class credit. All participants were treated within APA 
ethical guidelines approved by internal review board. 
Stimuli & Apparatus 
 Stimuli were designed using the open source 3D design software, Blender (v2.66; The 
Blender Foundation, www.blender.org) with open-source images (VMComix, 2011). All 
measurements below were calculated relative to a 19.5 LCD monitor (actual display: 42cm x 
24cm, 1600x900 px resolution, 60 Hz) at a viewing distance of approximately 70 cm. For 
reproducibility, units are reported in both pixels and approximate visual angle. 
All stimuli consisted of a number of search items, a wall and a male or female avatar 
(matched to participant gender, to avoid potential confounds of cross-gender perspective-taking 
discussed in Klein & Hodges, 2001). Avatars (occupying an approximate volume of 80 px  X 
345 px; 1.729° X 7.458°) were located on the left or right sides of the screen, with 185 px 
(3.999°) from the edge of the display to the front of the agent. A dark grey wall (70 px X 700 px; 
1.513° X 15.131°) appeared in the direct center of the screen (centered at 640 pixels from either 
display edge) in half of trails and on the far side of the screen opposing the avatar (with 250 
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pixels from the edge of the display to the front of the wall) on the other half of trials. The 
centered wall evenly divided all items shown, while the distal wall did not divide any targets. 
Search arrays consisted of 4, 8 or 12 blue items, similar to Landolt C’s. The nontargets 
were 40 px2 (.865°) outlined squares (10 px, .216°line thickness) with a 12 px (0.259°) gap on 
the left, right or bottom side. Target items were identical to nontarget items, except that the gap 
appeared on the top of the square. Items were presented in an evenly spaced 4 x 3 grid of 
possible locations with a minimum of 48 px (1.038°) between each item.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Representative search displays used in Experiment 1. Participants responded 
whether they or the avatar could see an upward facing C shape. Targets either appeared in the 
cluster Near or Far from the avatar. Placement of a wall determined whether the avatar’s 
perspective of the scene was Visible or Occluded. Note that avatars did not have visual access to 
targets in Occluded + Far trials. 
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Stimuli were completely counterbalanced across five dimensions. (1) Displays had set 
sizes of 4, 8, or 12 items. (2) An avatar either appeared on the left or right side of the display. (3) 
A wall either appeared in the center of the screen (Occluded displays) or was to the distal side of 
the avatar (Visible displays). (4) Targets appeared in one of the six item locations Near the avatar 
or Far from the avatar. Far targets in Occluded trials were blocked by the wall and thus not 
visible to the avatar, facilitating direct comparison to Far targets in Visible trials, which were 
located in the same regions of space but critically inaccessible to avatars. Eight displays were 
made for each unique combination of these first four dimensions, generating 192 displays.  (5) A 
corresponding target absent display was made from each of the target present displays by 
rotating the target item. Thus all target absent trials were directly comparable to all target present 
trails. This led to a total of 384 displays. 
 
Procedure 
Upon giving consent, participants completed the entire experiment using a graphic 
interface designed in Python using the PsychoPy toolkit (Pierce, 2007). Participants read 
instructions before completing a tutorial. The tutorial consisted of five practice trials that 
demonstrated different trial types outlined below. Participants repeated the tutorial until they 
reached 100% accuracy. They then verbally confirmed their understanding of the instructions 
with the experimenter before proceeding. 
Each trial consisted of a fixation cross in the center of the screen for 500 ms, followed by 
a perspective cue for 750 ms and the stimulus display. Perspective cues either primed the 
participant’s perspective (Self trials: “YOU”) or the avatar’s perspective (Other trials: “HIM” or 
“HER”, contingent on participant gender). Participants responded whether the avatar could see 
the target in Other trials, and responded whether targets were present anywhere in the display 
during Self trials. Stimuli were displayed until participants responded. Participants viewed each 
stimulus twice, once with a Self cue and once with an Other cue, for a total of 768 trials. Trials 
were randomly presented over six blocks. Participants were given a self-paced break between 
blocks. 
The fixation cross provided feedback after every trial, displaying green following an 
accurate response and red following an inaccurate response. Participants were instructed to 
respond as fast as possible while still maintaining accuracy. Participant accuracy was displayed 
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at the end of each block. Participants were instructed to aim for 95% accuracy, and were 
encouraged to speed up if accuracy was above 97% and slow down if accuracy fell below 93%. 
The entire experiment took less than 45 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Average search slope and intercept in Experiment 1. Results calculated from target-
present, accurate responses. Error bars here and throughout the paper denote standard error of 
the mean for repeated measures designs (O’Brian & Cousineau, 2014). 
 
 
  Visible  Occluded 
  Near Far Near Far 
Self Intercept (ms) 594 (52.9) 567 (45.5) 594  (40.7) 689  (48.3) 
 Slope (ms/item) 42.4 (6.6) 49.4  (5.9) 51.6 (6.3) 39.3 (5.5) 
 Error (%) 10.6 (4.3) 14.9 (5.5) 9.7 (4.5) 11.3  (4.9) 
Other Intercept (ms) 702 (57.8) 687 (79.3) 680 (50.5) 767  (33.8) 
 Slope (ms/item) 32.6 (6.5) 43.2  (8.9) 30.5 (5.5) 57.0 (6.2) 
 Error (%) 10.9 (4.7) 12.8 (5.9) 8.2 (4.6) 9.8 (5.4) 
 
Table 3.1. Summary search performance in Experiment 1. Values are for target-present, 
accurate trials. Values in parentheses indicate one standard error of the mean. 
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Results 
Table 3.1 summarizes search performance. The present experiment was centrally 
concerned with Self trials, as these reflected differences generated even when attempting to 
ignore the avatar, and also because Other trials required fundamentally different responses. For 
instance, the optimal strategy for Other-Occluded trials only required participants to scan half the 
screen shared by the avatar before making a decision. However, participants could also search 
for all targets before making a response. In both cases, participants in Other-Occluded-Far trials 
would have to detect a target and then form a negative response, effectively detecting a target but 
saying the avatar could not see it. These trials differed from Self trials, where participants simply 
had to search for a target and respond. If participants are sensitive to other perspectives, then 
these Self trials should be affected. Nonetheless, analyses for Other trials are included for their 
interest to future research. Outside of planned contrasts, all comparisons for the remainder of the 
paper were corrected for false discovery rate using the Benjamini-Hochberg-Yekutieli procedure 
for repeated measures (Benjamini & Yekutieli, 2001). 
 
Accuracy 
Participants demonstrated relatively few false-alarms to target-absent trials (Mself = 
98.0% correct reject, Mother = 98.7% correct reject). Participants were also relatively accurate for 
target present trials in both conditions (Mself = 88.4% correct, Mother = 89.6% correct). Although 
participants demonstrated more errors than typical visual search experiments, errors were 
expected given the additional complexity of the perspective-taking task. A 2 (Perspective: Self vs 
Other) x 2 (Visibility: Visible vs Occluded) x 2 (Proximity: Near vs Far) ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of Visibility (F1,13 = 5.712, p = .0327), a marginal effect of Proximity 
(F1,13 = 3.404, p = .088) and no effect of Perspective (F1,13 = .867, p = .329). However, post-hoc 
comparisons revealed no significant differences between conditions (p’s > .44). Only accurate 
trials were analyzed further. 
 
Response Times 
A 3 (Set Size: 4,8, or 12) x 2 (Target: Present vs. Absent) ANCOVA revealed a 
significant linear effect of set size on response time (F1,13 = 103.9, p < .001). Target Absent trials 
were significantly slower than Target Present trials at a ratio of 1.45:1 (F1,13 = 52.32, p < .001). 
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There was also a significant Set Size*Target interaction, revealing a significant increase in 
search slope between Target Present and Target Absent trials at a 2.42:1 ratio (F1,13 = 52.32, p < 
.001). Given the presence of a significant slope effect, the remainder of analyses only used 
response times from target-present trials. 
Search Slopes. A 2 (Perspective: Self vs. Other) x 2 (Visibility: Visible vs. Occluded) x 2 
(Target Proximity: Near avatar vs. Far from avatar) ANOVA revealed no significant main effects 
of Perspective, Visibility or Perspective (all F1,13 < 1.613, p > .226). There was a marginal 
Perspective*Proximity interaction (F1,13 = 3.980, p = .067) and a significant 
Perspective*Visibility*Proximity interaction (F1,13 = 7.819, p = .015). However, paired 
comparisons identified no significant differences (p’s > .29).  
Intercepts. A 2 (Perspective: Self vs. Other) x 2 (Visibility: Visible vs. Occluded) x 2 
(Target Proximity: Near avatar vs. Far from avatar) ANOVA revealed no main effects of 
Perspective (F1,13 = 2.662, p = .127), Proximity (F1,13 = 0.591, p = .456) or Visibility (F1,13 = 
2.066, p = .174). There was a marginal Visibility*Proximity interaction (F1,13 = 3.792, p = 
.0734). However, post-hoc tests revealed no significant differences (p’s > .20)  
 
Planned Contrast 1: Global Perspective-Taking 
 The first planned contrast tested for the possibility that participants efficiently calculated 
the avatar’s visual access over large portions of the visual field at one time. Global perspective-
taking would result in increased search intercepts during Occluded trials. However, participants 
demonstrated no difference in intercepts between Self-Occluded and Self-Visible trials (mean 
difference: 58.8 ms; t13 = 1.143, p = .274). These results suggest that participants do not 
automatically process the avatar’s perspective prior to search. 
 
Planned Contrast 2: Serial Perspective-Taking 
 The second planned contrast tested for differences in slope as a function of the agent’s 
visibility of a scene. If viewers represent each searched item from the other agent’s perspective, 
we would predict greater search slopes for Occluded trials. However, participants demonstrated 
no difference in search slopes between Self-Occluded and Self-Visible trials (mean difference: 
0.19 ms/item; t13 = 0.028, p = .978). The results suggest that participants do no process each item 
in a display from multiple perspectives. 
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Planned Contrast 3: Search Initiation Bias 
 The presence of an agent may shape participant behavior regardless of that agent’s 
perspective. In practice, a search initiation bias would require participants to search through 
fewer items on average if the target is near the avatar than if it were far from the avatar, resulting 
in increased slopes as a function of target distance from the avatar. The third planned comparison 
thus tested whether search slopes increased when targets were Far versus Near the avatar. 
Participants demonstrated no overall differences between Near and Far slopes in Self trials 
(mean difference: 2.88 ms; t13 = .659, p = .52). There was no difference between Self-Visible-
Near and Self-Visible-Far slopes (mean difference: 7.05 ms; t13 = .856, p = .407). Surprisingly, 
participant slopes were marginally slower in Self-Occluded-Near trials than in Self-Occluded-Far 
trials (mean difference: 12.26 ms; t13 = 2.110, p = .055). These results are consistent with 
participants preferentially searching the region inaccessible to the avatar. 
 
Planned Contrast 4: Response Inhibition 
 Another’s perspective may not influence search but nonetheless generate processing costs 
if individuals calculate perspective after search termination, as they formulate a response. This 
would demonstrate a cost of decision-making rather than visual attention. The final planned 
comparison therefore tested whether search intercepts increased in Self-Occluded-Far trials 
versus Self-Visible-Far trials. As displays were identical in every way between displays save for 
the location of the obstructing wall, differences between these trials constitute interference 
incurred after selection of an occluded target. Although participants trended towards faster 
intercepts in Self-Visible-Far trials than in Self-Occluded-Far trials, this difference was not 
significant (mean difference: 122.07 ms; t13 = 1.339, p = .102). 
 
Discussion 
Participants demonstrated no differences in accuracy, search slopes or search intercepts 
when searching a scene with or without a conflicting perspective. These results run counter to 
theories of perspective taking that would predict either rapid global attentional capture of 
another’s perspective or a serial representation of each item’s visibility by the agent. However, 
when targets were both far from the avatar and occluded, participants trended toward shallower 
		 69	
search slopes. These results are consistent with a surprising inversion of search initiation bias: 
participants initiated search where the avatar could not see. 
Search slopes, and therefore serial deployment of visual attention, did not increase for 
Self trials when the avatar had an Occluded perspective. If anything, participants showed trends 
of searching faster on a per-item basis when the avatar could not see the target. It is possible that 
participants registered the presence of a differing perspective and began their search in regions 
that the avatar could not access. This complements research on cooperative visual search 
(Brennan et al., 2008), though such behavior has never been recorded in spontaneous search 
behavior.  
Despite the large number of trials, the number of factors involved in the analysis greatly 
reduced statistical power. Furthermore, it was possible that any differences between stimuli were 
diminished by the relative ease of the search task, and that a more difficult search task would 
reveal stronger effects of cognitive load from perspective-taking. I therefore ran a second 
experiment with more participants to explore whether trends for search preference in regions 
unseen by a social agent increased with more difficult stimuli. 
 
Experiment 2  
 Experiment 2 replicated the design Experiment 1 using difficult search stimuli. If 
participants automatically calculate the presence of a differing perspective before or after search, 
then we should again see increased search intercepts in Self-Occluded-Far trials. Furthermore, 
participants in these trials should show reduced search slopes if they initiate search where the 
agent cannot visually access. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
 Power analyses conducted using effects sizes for the critical paired comparison of Self-
Occluded-Near vs. Self-Occluded-Far slopes (dz = .58) suggested that twenty-five participants 
were necessary to replicate significant differences in search slope with 80% power. A total of 25 
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Vanderbilt University students (20 female, 22 right-handed, median age = 19) participated for 
class credit. 
 
Stimuli & Procedure 
Stimuli were identical in design and counterbalancing to Experiment 1 with one 
difference. To increase difficulty of the search, the diagnostic gap that identified items as targets 
or distractors was reduced from 12 px (0.259°) to 5 px (.108°). The size and spacing of items 
were otherwise unchanged. 
 
Results 
 
Accuracy 
Summary statistics are documented in Table 3.2, and visualized in Figure 3.3. 
Participants demonstrated relatively fewer false alarms (Mself = 99.5% correct reject, Mother = 
99.5% correct reject and greater target detection than in Experiment 1 (Mself = 92.9% correct, 
Mother = 93.2% correct). A 2 (Perspective: Self vs Other) x 2 (Visibility: Visible vs Occluded) x 2 
(Proximity: Near vs Far) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of Visibility (F1,24 = 19.36, p 
< .001) and Proximity (F1,24 = 4.971, p = .035), but no effect of Perspective (F1,24 = .427, p = 
.520). There was a Visibility*Proximity interaction effect (F1,24 = 8.216, p = .008), but no 
interaction of Perspective*Proximity (F1,24 = 2.914, p = .101) or Perspective*Visibility (F1,24 = 
0.614, p = .441), nor a three-way interaction (F1,24 = 2.891, p = .102). Post-hoc comparisons 
revealed that participants were significantly worse at Other-Occluded-Far trials than any Other 
trial (lowest t24 = 2.825, p’s < .024), though again these trials required fundamentally different 
responses. All Self perspective pairs were non-significant (highest t24 = 2.547, p > .13). 
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Figure 3.3. Average search slope and intercept in Experiment 2. Results calculated from 
accurate, target-present trials. Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
 
  Visible  Occluded 
  Near Far Near Far 
Self Intercept (ms) 543 (51.9) 723 (29.9) 635  (38.7) 759  (33.4) 
 Slope (ms/item) 82.9 (7.7) 58.8  (3.5) 84.2 (5.3) 60.5 (5.2) 
 Error (%) 5.8 (0.7) 6.0 (0.8) 8.0 (0.9) 8.6  (0.7) 
Other Intercept (ms) 653 (40.1) 750 (27.6) 642 (26.4) 781  (40.2) 
 Slope (ms/item) 71.1 (5.4) 72.8  (4.5) 65.2 (3.3) 86.4 (5.0) 
 Error (%) 6.1 (0.7) 5.9 (0.4) 5.2 (0.5) 9.7 (0.9) 
 
Table 3.2. Summary search performance in Experiment 2. Values illustrate accurate, target-
present trials. Values in parentheses indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
Response Times 
A 3 (Set Size: 4, 8, or 12) x 2 (Target: Present vs. Absent) ANCOVA across all 
conditions revealed a significant linear effect of set size on response time (F1,24 = 334.4, p < 
.001). Target Absent trials were significantly slower than Target Present trials at a ratio of 1.45:1 
(F1,24 = 157.8, p < .001), identical to Experiment 1. There was also a significant Set Size*Target 
interaction, revealing a significant increase in search slope between Target Present and Target 
Absent trials at a 2.07:1 ratio (F1,24 = 158.4 p < .001), again quite similar to Experiment 1. Given 
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the presence of a significant slope effect, the remainder of analyses only used response times 
from target-present trials. 
Search Slopes. A 2 (Perspective: Self vs. Other) x 2 (Visibility: Visible vs. Occluded) x 2 
(Target Proximity: Near avatar vs. Far from avatar) ANOVA revealed no significant main effects 
of Perspective (F1,24 =.435, p = .516), Visibility (F1,24 =.363, p = .553) or Proximity (F1,24 = 
2.786, p = .108). There was no Perspective*Visibility interaction (F1,24 = .086, p = .772) or 
Visibility*Proximity interaction (F1,24 =1.951 p = .175). There was a significant 
Perspective*Proximity interaction (F1,24 =28.572, p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
Self-Far slopes were significantly faster than Self-Near slopes (t24 = 4.642, p < .001) and that 
Other-Far slopes were significantly slower than Other-Near slopes (t24 = 2.682, p = .046). There 
was no three-way interaction (F1,24 = 1.066, p = .312). 
Intercepts. A 2 (Perspective: Self vs. Other) x 2 (Visibility: Visible vs. Occluded) x 2 
(Target Proximity: Near avatar vs. Far from avatar) ANOVA revealed no effect of Perspective 
(F1,24 = 2.979, p = .097) or Visibility (F1,24 = 1.236, p = .277), but there was significant effect of 
Proximity (F1,24 = 20.150, p < .001) with Near trials having overall faster intercepts. There were 
no interactions (all F1,24 <1, p > .322). 
 
Planned Contrast 1: Global Perspective-Taking 
 The first planned contrast tested for global processing of the agent’s perspective, which 
would result in increased search intercepts when perspectives conflicted in Occluded trials. 
Participants demonstrated no difference between Self-Occluded intercepts and Self-Visible 
intercepts (mean difference: 43.4 ms; t24 = 0.757, p = .456). 
 
Planned Contrast 2: Serial Perspective-Taking 
 The second planned contrast tested an effect of an agent’s visual access on serial search, 
as identified by increasing slope as a function of agent perceptual access. Participants 
demonstrated no difference in search slopes between Self-Occluded and Self-Visible trials (mean 
difference: 10.53 ms/item; t24 =1.427, p = .167). 
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Planned Contrast 3: Search Initiation Bias 
 The third planned contrast tested for an effect of agent location on search initiation bias, 
as identified by increasing slope as a function of target distance from the avatar. Participants had 
significantly faster search slopes in Far trials (mean: 59.63 ms/item) than Near trials (83.56 
ms/item; t24 = 5.153, p < .001). This was true in both Visible (t24 = 2.603, p = 008) and Occluded 
trials (t24 = 3.074, p = 003). 
 
Planned Contrast 4: Response Inhibition 
 The final planed contrast tested whether participants incurred processing costs after 
selection of a target that was occluded from the avatar. However, intercepts did not differ 
between Self-Visible Far and Self-Occluded-Far trials (mean difference: 36.19 ms; t24 = 0.029,   
p = .488).  
 
Exploratory Analysis 
Previous designs measuring rapid perspective-taking were carefully controlled to present 
items within the range of subitization, between 0-4 targets, suggested to be the general capacity 
of efficient visual attentional processing (Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). As discussed in the 
introduction, these previous experiments (including Chapter 2 of this dissertation) found 
significant processing delays when these small sets of objects were obstructed from another 
agent. Although Experiment 2 found no evidence in support of a global perspective-taking 
hypothesis, wherein participants rapidly calculate an agent’s view of the entire scene as indicated 
by search intercepts, it is possible that global perspective-taking might arise in displays within 
the range of efficient attentional processing. Furthermore, the slope effects of both experiments 
suggest that individuals initiate search in regions far from the avatar. However, this slope 
increase might indicate a strategy implemented by participants when set sizes are too large to 
permit global perspective-taking. In order words, participants may search from the avatar’s 
perspective when the number of objects in the display can be captured by efficient attentional 
processing, and adopt a strategy to look where the avatar cannot access when the number of 
objects exceeds attentional capacity.  
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Figure 3.4. Standard scores of response times in Self trials for Experiment 2. Individuals 
responded faster to targets near the avatar in small set sizes and faster to targets far from the 
avatar in larger set sizes. Z-scores were calculated from average scores from each conditions 
within each set divided by standard deviation. The minimum score was then added to each z-
score for visualization purposes. Statistical analyses were conducted on raw data.   
 
Figure 3.4 visualizes standardized increases in response time by condition and set size. A 
2 (Visibility: Visible vs. Occluded) x 2 (Target Proximity: Near avatar vs. Far from avatar) 
ANOVA for Self trials with a set size of 4 revealed that participants were significantly slower to 
respond to Occluded trials (mean: 990 ms) than Visible trials (mean: 908 ms; F1,24 = 10.740, p = 
.003), and were significantly slower in Far trials (mean: 975 ms) than Near trials (mean: 923 ms; 
F1,24 = 5.569, p = .027), with no interaction (F1,24 = 0.037, p = .848). Meanwhile, the same 
analysis for trials with a set size of 12 also revealed significantly slower response times for 
Occluded trials (mean: 1593 ms) than for Visible trials (mean: 1424 ms; F1,24 = 12.322, p = 
.002), but found significantly faster response times for Far trials (mean: 1431 ms) than for Near 
trials (mean: 1585 ms; F1,24 = 17.919, p < .001), and a significant Visibility*Proximity 
interaction (F1,24 = 4.236, p = .05). Paired comparisons controlling for false discovery rate using 
the Benjamini-Hochberg-Yekutieli procedure revealed significantly slower responding in 
Occluded-Near trials (mean: 1710 ms) than in Visible-Near (mean:1461 ms; t24 = 3.122, p = 
.011), Visible-Far (mean: 1387 ms; t24 = 5.888, p < .001) or Occluded-Far trials (mean: 1474 ms; 
t24 = 4.259, p < .001). No other comparisons were significant (p > .312).  
		 75	
These results, although exploratory, support an automatic detection of another’s 
conflicting perspective revealed through increases in overall response time in occluded trials in 
both set sizes. It is methodologically interesting to find overall increases in response times in 
both Set Size 4 and Set Size 12 in Occluded scenes despite the lack of a significant intercept 
effect in the general results. The intercept effect was potentially offset by marginal variations in 
slope between trials. In this case, the increased slope in Occluded-Far trials greatly influences 
projection of search intercept, masking differences between conditions. Analysis of average RT 
across trials is unusual for visual search experiments, but nonetheless reveals processing costs 
when the avatar’s perspective is occluded. 
This exploratory analysis indicates that Experiments 1 and 2 may be capturing two 
distinct processes. The first is a potentially automatic guidance of attention to the agent, leading 
to slower response times in Occluded trials and faster response times when the target is near the 
avatar in small display sizes. However, this initial bias gives way to a second, potentially learned 
strategy to search areas far from the avatar when the number of objects exceeds the capacity of 
efficient processing.  
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the main findings from Experiment 1. Participants demonstrated 
a significant search initiation bias, with faster search slopes in Self-Far trials than in Self -Near 
trials. This expanded replication of Experiment 1 found this effect for both Occluded and Visible 
trials. These results suggest that participants registered the location of the agent and initiated 
their search where the agent could not see. 
Exploratory analyses examining response times for small and large set sizes further 
inform a potential source of search initiation bias. Increased average response times during 
Occluded trials suggest an overall processing cost associated with viewing a scene with an 
inconsistent perspective. It is possible that individuals deploy attention to the locations of joint 
perceptual access, but have a heuristic to search areas of privileged access when search is 
difficult. Whether this secondary search is a strategy learned through the design of this 
experiment or a more general heuristic applicable to other social scenes is a matter for future 
experiments specifically tailored to such questions. 
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General Discussion 
 Previous research suggests humans possess a system for rapidly guiding attention to the 
perspectives of others, but no research has demonstrated whether such a system actually alters 
deployment of attention. In two experiments, I tested how the presence of a social agent 
influenced visual search of a simple scene. These experiments indicated that individuals do in 
fact rapidly incorporate other people’s perspectives into their search strategies, however they do 
so in a surprising manner: participants demonstrate a search initiation bias, preferentially looking 
at regions of space that are distant and occluded from the agent. These results support an 
emerging literature on automatic processes in social cognition, and are the first to illustrate a role 
of early visual attention in such processing. 
  The tendency of individuals to first search regions inaccessible to another agent aligns 
with previous research on collaboration in visual search tasks. Researchers found that pairs of 
individuals were most efficient when they could see each other’s eye movements (Brennan, 
Chen, Dickinson, Neider & Zelinski, 2008). It is possible that the rapid calculation of other’s 
perspectives as in Chapter 2 of this dissertation alerts participants to the regions of space 
accessible by another agent, and that visual search is biased for collaboration or competition. 
 There are several theories of automaticity in mental state reasoning, as detailed in the 
introduction. These theories vary in their assertion of domain-specificity and the core 
mechanisms involved, however all hypothesize a mechanism by which individuals detect the 
mental states of another agent. The current experiment sheds some light onto future models. 
First, the core finding that individuals alter their behavior in response to detecting another’s 
perspective gives credit to the assumption that some form of calculation occurs rapidly in the 
perceptual stream. Second, differences in search slopes suggest that participants used this 
information to guide search, but does not suggest an overall attentional cost. Rather, these 
results, though admittedly preliminary, suggest that individuals detect the presence of an agent 
and heuristically search the space opposite the agent. This is consistent with the results of 
Chapter 2, which found that increasing number and magnitude of differing perspectives does not 
alter responding in the dot-perspective task. Rather than directing attention to those objects that 
another person can see, it may be that a rapid system detects the presence of other agents and 
guides search to privileged information. 
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 Notably, these results neither confirm nor deny the capture of attention by social stimuli. 
In the present design, we would expect participants to demonstrate overall intercept delays if 
recognition of the avatar’s visual access delayed responding overall but did not affect 
deployment of attention to each individual item in the scene (global perspective-taking). No such 
differences were found. Conversely, we would predict increased slopes if identification of items 
required evaluation of the agent’s perspective for each item (serial perspective-taking). This 
difference was also not found. Crucially, exploratory analysis indicates that search initiation bias 
need not imply capture of attention by social agents. Rather, participants may have adopted a 
strategy to search the area opposing the avatar, either through training throughout the study or 
through a more general heuristic.  
Several additional experiments are necessary before strong conclusions can be made. 
First, the exploratory findings of Experiment 2 suggest that the current design may capture two 
processes: an early-acting evaluation of another agent’s visual access and a late-acting strategy to 
search items far from the avatar. One way of diverging these behaviors would be a stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA) testing the participant’s ability to detect a target in a brief window of 
time (e.g., 120ms, 250ms, 500 ms or 1000 ms presentations). If attention is captured by social 
stimuli, detection of targets should increase with proximity to the avatar, even at low SOA’s.  
Although the current design necessitated cues to take a perspective before stimulus onset, 
it is possible that these cues also gave participants a 750 ms window to form a search strategy. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the act of preferentially searching the agent’s space when taking 
the Other’s perspective led participants to take the opposite strategy when taking an egocentric 
perspective. It would therefore be worthwhile to replicate these effects without taking the Other’s 
perspective. Such an experiment could have periodic attention checks to ensure that participants 
continued to note the location of the avatar even without directly taking its perspective. Given 
that previous accounts of rapid perspective-taking have revealed effects during purely egocentric 
report (Samson et al, 2011), a replication of Experiment 2 should reveal identical effects if 
participants did not adopt a unique Self search strategy that opposed Other search strategies. 
Visual search experiments were designed to assess how attention guides eye movements 
in a time when the computational power required to monitor and analyze eye movements was not 
readily available. In the current era, however, more direct methods can test where and when 
individuals look at regions of space. In a pilot study, I ran 16 participants through a modified 
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version of Experiment 2 while monitoring their eye movements. Participants overall performed 
quite poorly on this task, perhaps due to accidental decreases in visual angle of the target stimuli 
as a consequence of fixed head positions in the eye tracking apparatus. Search slopes were twice 
of those in the first two experiments. However, participants in these experiments demonstrated 
the opposite finding of Experiment 2: Participants robustly searched the region near the avatar 
first. This trend appeared both in participant search slopes and in their first saccades and 
fixations. This data complicates interpretation of the current study, and necessitates replication to 
completely understand these behaviors. 
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